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The Great and Mighty Tax Law 
HOW THE ROBERTS COURT HAS REDUCED 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF TAXES AND TAX 
EXPENDITURES 
Linda Sugin† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Roberts Court has written two important tax 
opinions. Both endow the tax law with legal superpowers, 
giving it the astonishing ability to elude constitutional limits. 
The justices have sent Congress and state legislatures a strong 
and clear message: they may use their tax laws as a means to 
aggressively enact public objectives unrelated to the traditional 
revenue-raising function of taxation. The justices have also 
made clear that the Court will uphold policies administered 
through the tax law even where those same policies would be 
unconstitutional if administered as either direct regulation or 
appropriated spending.  
In National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius (NFIB),1 the tax law saved the Affordable Care Act 
(Obamacare or ACA) from death at the hands of the Commerce 
Clause. The case confirmed the broad reach of the taxing power 
under the Constitution, and showed the current high Court’s 
willingness to treat regulatory legislation as taxation, even 
where Congress declined to call the legislation a “tax.” The 
  
 † Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Many thanks to Yariv Brauner, 
Brian Galle, Abner Greene, Dan Halperin, Louis Kaplow, Charlene Luke, Diane Ring, 
Stephen Shay, David Walker, and the students at Harvard Law School and the 
University of Florida Law School Tax Policy Colloquia for helpful discussion and 
comments on prior drafts. 
 1 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), No. 11-393, slip op. at 1 (U.S. 
June 28, 2012). 
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cliffhanger ending to the Obamacare challenge may have been 
made possible by a much-less publicized—but more legally 
radical—case from the previous term, Arizona Christian 
Schools Tuition Organization v. Winn (ACS).2 In the ACS case, 
the Court adopted a novel judicial approach to targeted tax 
benefits for religious schools. It rejected the widely accepted 
treatment of tax expenditures as government spending 
administered through the tax law, and instead treated them as 
simple tax cuts. It thereby allowed tax benefits that are 
functional equivalents to direct government spending to bypass 
the constitutional scrutiny to which both taxes and direct 
spending are usually subject. Tax benefits are now beyond even 
the reach of the Bill of Rights, which prohibits government 
from treading on individual rights. 
This is bad news for the tax law, and maybe for the 
Constitution as well. Both of these cases aggravate a growing 
tension between the economic and legal analyses of taxation, 
widening the gap between these two central approaches to tax 
law. The Court transformed tax expenditures from state action, 
ordinarily subject to constitutional limits, into nonreviewable 
private spending by individuals. This development reduces the 
protection that the Constitution provides to individuals, 
undermines tax reform efforts and fiscal responsibility, 
jeopardizes established legal doctrine, and discourages 
transparent and equitable governance. 
NFIB confirms established law that Congress’s power 
under the Constitution’s taxing power is vast. In that case, the 
Court concluded that Obamacare’s so-called “shared 
responsibility payment”3 constituted a tax, and was therefore 
within Congress’s enumerated powers. The payment must be 
made by individuals who fail to procure health insurance4 
despite the ACA’s instruction that they do.5 The Court treated 
the payment as a tax, rather than as a penalty for failure to 
comply with the statutory requirement, even though Congress 
did not label it a tax. The Court’s holding pursuant to the 
taxing power in NFIB is important because a majority of the 
Court agreed that the individual mandate—if understood as a 
requirement for people to procure health insurance—was 
  
 2 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn (ACS), 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
 3 I.R.C. § 5000A(b) (2010). 
 4 Internal Revenue Code § 5000A(b) imposes the payment requirement, 
calling it a “penalty.” 
 5 Internal Revenue Code § 5000A(a) imposes the “[r]equirement to maintain 
minimum essential coverage.” 
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beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.6 
Congress cannot make people buy health insurance, but it can 
nudge them to do so by increasing the price of going without it. 
People who refuse to buy health insurance are not law-
breakers, but taxpayers. The Supreme Court has long accepted 
Congress’s vast authority under the tax power,7 including the 
power to regulate though taxation, so the decision is not legally 
surprising on this point.8 There was more than ample precedent 
for the Court to follow in treating the shared responsibility 
payment as a tax.9 Nevertheless, the decision highlights the 
potential for the tax law to swallow all government policy; a 
shrinking Commerce Clause invites Congress to consider a 
more aggressive use of the tax power. Congress can regulate 
through taxation as long as it limits its regulatory mechanism 
to affecting prices, which is all that taxation can do. Taxation 
rises in importance in the overall legislative scheme, even 
though NFIB breaks no new legal ground, because of the 
contraction of Congress’s other available tools.10 The decision 
invites Congress to tax anything that it cannot otherwise 
regulate. While that invitation may go largely unheeded 
because of the political opposition to raising taxes,11 it implies a 
broader scope for the Internal Revenue Code.  
  
 6 NFIB, slip op. at 16-27. 
 7 See, e.g., The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866) (“It is 
true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the 
Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications.”). 
 8 See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953) (“It is conceded that a 
federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or deters the 
activities taxed. Nor is the tax invalid because the revenue obtained its negligible.”); 
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (“Every tax is in some measure 
regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed 
as compared with others not taxed. But a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a 
regulatory effect.”). 
 9 See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects 
Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1239-40 (2012) (foreshadowing Justice 
Roberts’ approach); Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 83, 86 (2012); Linda Sugin & Benjamin Zipursky, Regulation, Taxation, and 
Coercion: Understanding Chief Justice Roberts’ Defense of the Mandate (Oct. 2, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review); Brian Galle, 
Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 27, 28-30 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/5/31/galle.html; Andrew 
Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care 
Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 10-11 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/04/ 
26/koppelman.html. 
 10 The Commerce Clause has been under stress in the Court for some time. 
See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (regulation of violence 
against women not authorized by Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995) (regulation of guns near schools not authorized by Commerce Clause). 
 11 “Taxes dominate domestic politics.” Jill Lepore, Tax Time: Why We Pay, 
NEW YORKER, Nov. 26, 2012, at 25; see also Galle, supra note 9, at 35. 
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The Court’s 2011 decision in ACS is a more significant 
expansion of the tax law’s power than NFIB because that 
decision broke new legal ground by placing tax expenditures 
beyond review under the Establishment Clause. That case 
concerned a provision in the Arizona state income tax that 
granted a dollar-for-dollar tax credit for transfers to state 
tuition organizations (STOs), organizations that subsidize 
private school tuition of Arizona children. The Court held that 
the tax credit was not constitutionally reviewable state action,12 
characterizing it instead as an abstention from legislative 
action.13 The tax credit was treated as a legislative decision to 
not tax, turning STO contributions into private action instead 
of state action, even though the tax credit financed the entire 
outlay dollar for dollar.14 Because the actions were private, they 
were beyond the Court’s concerns about constitutionality. The 
plaintiffs were dismissed for lack of standing because the Court 
determined that they failed to adequately prove that the tax 
credit was government taxing and spending.15 The tax-credit 
mechanism pulled all the constitutional weight in foreclosing 
review because an economically equivalent program allocating 
state treasury funds to the STOs would have been reviewable 
as a possible unconstitutional establishment of religion. The 
ACS case gives Congress and state legislatures an incentive to 
adopt tax credits for anything that might be constitutionally 
suspect under the Bill of Rights. As long as the legislature 
designs a preference for religion as a tax benefit, it is now 
effectively beyond judicial review.  
This article considers the implications of these decisions 
for the law and policy of taxation. It argues that these cases 
undercut the tax law’s revenue-raising role and give it 
tremendous potential to overcome constitutional obstacles that 
legislatures face.16 The holdings also introduce confusion into 
the law of taxation by incentivizing the adoption of more non-
revenue policy in the tax law17 and blurring the conceptual 
structure of taxation.18 This article claims that these decisions 
  
 12 The Court held that the taxpayers lacked standing. ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 
1499 (2011). 
 13 Id. at 1447 (“[T]he government declines to impose a tax” when it awards a 
credit.). 
 14 Id. (“When Arizona taxpayers choose to contribute to STOs, they spend their 
own money, not money the State has collected from respondents or from other taxpayers.”).  
 15 Id. at 1447-49. 
 16 See infra Parts II and III. 
 17 See infra Parts II.F and III. 
 18 See infra Part III.B-C. 
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undermine the important work on tax reform and fiscal 
responsibility that other branches of government are doing.19 
They additionally create new doctrine that threatens established 
law on constitutional conditions attached to tax benefits.20 
Finally, these cases encourage legislatures to favor high-income 
taxpayers, giving them unwarranted financial and political 
advantages.21 While NFIB has received more attention than 
ACS, the earlier case was more important for the developments 
discussed here; it established the tax law’s power, which NFIB 
seized upon when upholding the ACA. 
Many tax articles are highly economic and not particularly 
legal, ignoring the tension between the economic effect and legal 
logic that is ubiquitous in the tax law. This article is an exception. 
It focuses on how the economics and the law of taxation conflict, 
and why legal consequences do not always track economic effects. 
This conflict reared its head in the stark divergence of the 
holdings of the two cases this article analyzes; most of the justices 
voting with the majority in one case voted in dissent in the other. 
In NFIB, economic equivalence prevailed and the majority upheld 
the mandate under the taxing power, even though the provision 
had many legal characteristics that distinguished it from the 
economically equivalent taxing scheme that it might have been.22 
In ACS, economic equivalence did not matter, and the Court 
refused to treat the tax credit as legally equivalent to the direct 
government-spending program that would have achieved the 
same economic results, even though the credit refunded the 
entire amount of an individual outlay, making it economically 
indistinguishable from a simple government transfer.23 These 
decisions are a turning point for the legal analysis of taxation. 
The next Part examines the two cases by fleshing out 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of what constitutes a tax, 
as compared to government regulation, and how we can 
  
 19 Congress and the President have been looking for ways to raise revenue, 
not reduce it. In the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, adopted at the precipice of 
the fiscal cliff, they agreed to allow rates to rise on high income taxpayers, estates, and 
capital gains. H.R. Res. 8, 112th Cong. (2013) (enacted Jan. 2, 2013). Long-term tax reform 
efforts are expected to focus more on reducing tax expenditures. See infra Part III.A. 
 20 See infra Part II.E. 
 21 See infra Part III.D. 
 22 See infra Part I.C. 
 23 It is well accepted to treat such credits as their direct spending 
equivalents. In fact, the federal government is required to treat such items as their 
direct spending equivalents by including them in the federal budget. See OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT (2013), at 248-64 [hereinafter ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2013], 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/analytical_perspectives. 
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recognize a diminution in taxation, as compared to government 
spending. Part II further parses the reasoning in the ACS 
opinion to illuminate the conceptual shift in judicial thinking 
about tax benefits that the case embodies, and explains the legal 
ramifications of the Court’s approach. Part III places these two 
decisions in the broader context of tax policy, analyzing the 
institutional and distributional implications of the Court’s 
reasoning. Parts II and III suggest that there is much to worry 
about. Part IV briefly concludes. 
I. WHAT IS A TAX? WHAT IS A TAX CUT?  
In NFIB, a majority of the Court concluded that the 
shared responsibility payment is a tax, allowing the Court to 
uphold Obamacare’s mandate under the taxing power, even 
though a different majority believed that it was beyond 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause if understood as a 
penalty for unlawful behavior. In ACS, the Court refused to treat 
a tax credit that reimbursed taxpayers for payments made to 
STOs as either “taxing” or “spending,” the two possible categories 
in which a tax credit might be included, and instead turned it 
into a tax cut, which placed it beyond constitutional review. 
Thus, the Supreme Court adopted broad definitions of taxes 
and tax cuts, expanding legislative power in the face of 
constitutional challenge. Alternative interpretations, such as 
treating the respective laws as regulation with a penalty in 
NFIB, and as government spending in ACS, would have 
allowed greater judicial oversight. 
A. Obamacare’s Individual Mandate Is a Tax, Not a 
Regulatory Penalty 
In NFIB, the Court’s conclusion that the mandate is 
actually a tax, and not a penalty, stemmed from its observations 
that the shared responsibility payment is not very high, the 
requirement is codified in the Internal Revenue Code, and the 
payments are made to the Internal Revenue Service.24 The 
distinction between a tax and a penalty ultimately turned on 
whether the exaction is so heavy a levy that people will refrain 
from the taxed activity altogether.25 Under this standard, as 
long as a statute includes these formal aspects and does not 
  
 24 NFIB, No. 11-393, slip op. at 33-36 (U.S. June 28, 2012). 
 25 Id. at 36-38.  
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function as a prohibition of conduct, it should constitute a tax.26 
If Congress had simply called the shared responsibility payment 
a “tax,” justifying its constitutionality would likely have been 
easier. In NFIB, all the justices agreed that Congress could have 
constitutionally imposed a tax that achieved precisely what the 
Affordable Care Act legislation achieved; the dispute centered on 
whether it had, in fact, done so.27 Congress called the charge a 
“shared responsibility payment” and a “penalty,” not a “tax.” But 
the Court determined that Congress’s label does not control 
whether something is, in fact, a tax—and not a regulatory 
penalty—for purposes of the Constitution.28 Justice Roberts was 
persuaded that the payment should be treated as a tax based 
on a confluence of factors, rather than on some essential 
element that epitomizes taxation. Those factors were that 
Congress placed the shared responsibility payment in the 
Internal Revenue Code, that it was collected by the Internal 
Revenue Service, and that it “yields the essential feature of any 
tax: it produces at least some revenue for the Government.”29 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress 
the power to tax, but it does not define what a tax is. There are 
many individual statutory provisions in the federal tax scheme. 
Some of them form the structure of the tax by defining taxable 
income, some of them are necessary for administration, and 
others carve out exceptions from the tax’s coverage. Some 
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code are only marginally 
related to the general purpose of taxing income, as is the 
shared responsibility payment, which is primarily concerned 
with whether an individual has health insurance and not with 
accurate income measurement. The Constitution does not 
provide any guidance about which of these arguably extraneous 
elements are included under Congress’s taxing power, thus its 
silence lends discretion to the Court to conclude that every one 
constitutes a “tax.” 
In very rare cases, the Supreme Court has rejected a 
provision of the tax law as not constituting a “tax,” but only where 
the tax was disguising something else that was legally significant, 
such as a criminal penalty subject to the double jeopardy clause30 
  
 26 See Sugin & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 16-17; see also Cooter & Siegel, 
supra note 9, at 1229-36. 
 27 See NFIB, slip op. at 17 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 28 Id. at 34; see also Metzger, supra note 9 (discussing institutionalism). 
 29 NFIB, slip op. at 33. 
 30 Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778-83 (1994). 
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or a taking.31 The alternative to characterization as a tax in NFIB 
was to treat the payment as a regulatory penalty designed to 
enforce Obamacare’s requirement to acquire health insurance.32 
The joint dissent favored the latter characterization, which would 
have invalidated the provision as beyond Congress’s power.33 The 
majority conceded that the distinction between taxes and 
penalties continues to be important, but decided that the shared 
responsibility payment did not cross the line from tax to penalty.34  
There is no bright line distinguishing taxation from 
regulation accompanied by a penalty, and the tax law is 
important in regulating all manner of activities. The tax law 
imposes levies and administers subsidies for all sorts of 
activities, just as regulation might do.35 While there is a great 
deal of overlap between the legal regimes, the Supreme Court 
has treated some regulation as beyond Congress’s taxing 
power. The leading case on the distinction between taxes and 
penalties, cited extensively by Justice Roberts in his NFIB 
opinion, concerned taxes imposed on businesses that engaged 
in child labor.36 The purpose of the child labor tax was clearly to 
prevent employers from hiring children, and was an explicit 
end run around Congress’s inability to directly regulate child 
labor at the time.37 The child labor tax was ten percent of 
income38—substantial enough that no reasonable business 
would choose to pay it as a cost of business. The Supreme Court 
characterized the ostensible tax provision as a form of 
regulation and punishment, rather than a tax, and struck the 
statute down because it was not authorized by Congress’s 
taxing power.39 The Court refused to allow Congress to call 
  
 31 Cheaney v. Hooser, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 330, 345 (1848). 
 32 The NFIB court relied heavily on Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child 
Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922), which treated a so-called tax as a penalty. See 
infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
 33 NFIB, slip op. at 16-24 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 34 Id. at 43 (“we need not here decide the precise point at which an exaction 
becomes so punitive that the taxing power does not authorize it”). 
 35 The Treasury Department’s budget includes a comparison of tax 
expenditures and regulation that shows various similarities and differences in their 
operation and administration. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 332 (2006). 
 36 Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. at 38. The NFIB opinion may have revived 
that opinion from obsolescence. See Galle, supra note 9, at 29 (questioning whether 
case had been effectively overruled). 
 37 See generally Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 38 Bailey, 259 U.S. at 34. 
 39 “[A] court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the 
employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and regulatory 
effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this.” Id. at 37.  
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something a tax as an end run around a constitutional 
impediment.40 Later cases followed this lead. In Department of 
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the imposition of a tax under the double jeopardy 
clause.41 In that case, the Court held that the levy was not really 
a tax, but was instead an invalid criminal sanction because the 
“taxpayer” had already been punished once. The Court has also 
treated ostensible taxes as takings.42 Such cases, however, are 
the exception; in most instances, the Court has upheld the 
legislature’s characterization of a tax and treated it as such.43  
As a legal matter, it would be possible to treat each 
individual provision included in a taxing statute as a tax since 
it is part of the whole that constitutes the tax, essentially 
allowing the legislature to determine the constitutionality of a 
tax by designating it as one.44 It would also be possible for 
courts to focus solely on revenue, which would narrow the 
constitutional definition of a tax. Unfortunately, none of these 
characteristics are definitive. Placement in the tax law and 
collection by the Service is a pure formality. Revenue is more 
functional, but not definitive because fines and monetary 
penalties also yield revenue. So, revenue may be necessary, but 
cannot be sufficient to define a tax if the law is to maintain a 
distinction between taxes and penalties.45 The inquiry is more 
aggregative of multiple factors of comparison, and the shared 
responsibility payment has some other income-tax-like elements 
  
 40 “To give such magic to the word ‘tax’ would be to break down all 
constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the 
sovereignty of the states.” Id. at 38. 
 41 Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994). 
 42 The Court held that a tax levy crossed the line from a tax to an 
unauthorized taking where there is  
a palpable and flagrant departure from equality in the burthen as imposed 
upon the persons or property bound to contribute, or it must be palpable that 
persons or their property are subjected to a local burthen for the benefit of 
others, or for purposes in which they have no interest, and to which they are, 
therefore, not justly bound to contribute. 
Cheaney v. Hooser, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 330, 345 (1848); see also Henderson Bridge Co. v. 
Henderson City, 173 U.S. 592, 616 (1899). 
 43 Except in rare and special instances, the due process of law clause 
contained in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred 
upon Congress by the Constitution. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 
(1916); see also A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44-45 (1934) (collecting cases 
supporting this position). 
 44 That would allow the legislature to make the ultimate constitutional 
determination, which has been the Court’s role. See Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12. 
 45 In an ideal world, taxes would raise revenue while fines and penalties 
would not because everyone would be law-abiding, so they would never incur penalties.  
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that suggest it could be part of the larger scheme of income 
taxation in place. The most important provision is section 
5000A(c)(2), which determines the amount of the penalty by 
reference to an individual’s income and the size of his family. An 
income tax is levied based on an individual’s ability to pay, and 
both income and family size are relevant to that determination, 
so these factors argue for including the payment as an element 
of the income tax. At the same time, however, the shared 
responsibility payment does not quite fit in the model of an 
income tax. It is not a structural component of the existing tax 
system because it does not refine the definition of income nor 
does having health insurance relate directly to measuring an 
individual’s ability to pay taxes. The thing that is taxed under 
Obamacare is an individual’s decision to forego insurance, 
which is unique compared to the items of “income” taxed under 
the Code.46 The income tax does not generally tax decisions that 
individuals make or states of affairs; it rather looks to receipts 
and expenditures. Nevertheless, there are many provisions of 
the federal tax law that are not elements of the structural core 
that accurately measures income.  
While not appearing precisely like a tax, the shared 
responsibility payment also does not look precisely like an 
average penalty. The toll, as Justice Ginsburg called it,47 is 
unlike the penalty in the child labor cases because it is not very 
punitive. It is limited both by dollar amount and as a percentage 
of income, and will never exceed a modest sum.48 The majority 
considered it important that individuals might choose to pay the 
toll instead of complying with the mandate to insure.49 In 
addition, nonpayment does not lead to criminal sanctions,50 so if 
it were a “penalty,” the charge is unlikely to be perceived as a 
more substantial punishment beyond ordinary taxes.  
The crux of the tax-penalty distinction for purposes of 
the law depends on whether there is a legal duty underlying 
the exaction. Penalties are imposed for failure to comply with 
legal obligations, but taxes are imposed even on fully law-
abiding citizens. The distinction between a tax and a penalty—
on these terms—is not obvious and the substantive 
disagreement between the majority and the joint dissent comes 
  
 46 See I.R.C. § 61 (2006) (listing examples of income included in the tax base). 
 47 NFIB, slip op. at 17 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 48 I.R.C. § 5000A(c) (2010). The exact amount varies by individual, but is 
never onerous. 
 49 NFIB, slip op. at 35-36. 
 50 I.R.C. § 5000A(g). 
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down to the question of whether a legal duty exists.51 Reasonable 
people can disagree about whether the ACA imposes such a 
duty, and while elsewhere I have concluded that the best 
reading of the mandate is that it does not, I concede that the 
question is debatable.52 
The reason that the line between a tax and a penalty is 
not easy to draw is that taxes and penalties can be functional 
economic equivalents.53 Taxes and regulation are effective 
economic substitutes for one another because the same objective 
can often be achieved by either taxation or regulation coupled 
with a penalty. It is in the discretion of the legislature to decide 
which mechanism to employ. Put simply, economic analysis 
cannot solve the tax–penalty dilemma. Similarly, government 
spending can be achieved directly via appropriations, or 
indirectly through the tax system. There is a legal distinction 
separating those categories, even though the economics 
overlap. Indirect spending is accomplished via the tax system 
by allowing taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities if they 
engage in activities that the government wants to fund. 
Provisions in the tax system that operate as spending 
equivalents are called “tax expenditures,” because of their 
function as spending and their placement in the tax law. The 
next section discusses the Supreme Court’s recent attempt at 
defining tax expenditures. 
B. Tax Expenditures Are Now Constitutionally Irrelevant 
Tax Cuts 
Unlike Congress, state legislatures do not depend on 
enumerated powers in the Constitution; states can pass any 
law they like and regulate any conduct, subject only to the 
explicit constraints imposed by the Constitution. Because the 
Bill of Rights prohibits it, no state law may establish religion or 
  
 51 The dissent wrote, “[W]e have never held—never—that a penalty imposed 
for violation of the law was so trivial as to be in effect a tax.” NFIB, slip op. at 18 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 52 See Sugin & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 17-19 (arguing that there is no 
duty); Metzger, supra note 9, at 85 (describing Justice Roberts’ opinion as reflecting “a 
libertarian resistance to compulsory measures in favor of choice and incentives”). 
Professors Cooter and Siegel conclude that the statute is a tax, even though its 
“normative language appears to reflect a congressional judgment that failing to insure 
is wrong.” Cooter & Siegel, supra note 9, at 1240. 
 53 The theory proposed by Professors Cooter and Siegel suggests that there is 
a distinction based on effects. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 9, at 1198. I am less sure 
that it is always possible to draw that line, because the existence of an underlying duty 
may not always be determinable. See Sugin & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 17-19. 
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abridge speech or deny equal protection. Similarly, Congress is 
subject to these rights-based limitations on its legislation. 
Through its analysis in the ACS decision, the Supreme Court 
has created an irresistible incentive for both Congress and 
state legislatures to use their tax statutes to avoid the 
constitutional constraints on direct spending that apply to their 
non-tax powers.  
The ACS opinion makes tax benefits constitutionally 
unreviewable under the Establishment Clause by characterizing 
them as the legislature declining to impose a tax;54 the resulting 
subsidy to religious institutions is consequently private 
spending55 beyond constitutional concern. The tax credit at issue 
in the case produces a targeted reduction in tax for individuals 
who follow a narrow set of statutory parameters, effectively 
subsidizing the targeted activities. Nevertheless, the ACS 
decision treats the credit as though it is a tax cut similar to a 
reduction in rates, which reduces overall burdens rather than 
targeting specific expenditures. Characterizing such a targeted 
tax reduction as equivalent to a general cut in taxes—such as a 
rate reduction—is a truly radical development in the law. It 
effectively immunizes tax expenditures from constitutional 
review and gives them a unique constitutional status more 
privileged than other legislation.  
Tax expenditures56 function the same way as spending 
provisions but are located in the tax law. They include 
subsidies administered through the tax law that could have 
been delivered in another way. Tax credits reduce tax liability, 
and are an effective substitute for direct government transfers 
to taxpayers. Instead of the government allocating funds for 
particular programs, tax expenditures allow taxpayers to reduce 
their tax liabilities by participating in various activities 
enumerated in the statute,57 creating entitlements for taxpayers 
who can fit the statutory definition. For example, the government 
can provide matching grants out of federal funds to charities 
that individuals support,58 or it can achieve the same effect by 
  
 54 ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1499 (2011). 
 55 Id. at 1448. 
 56 Tax expenditures were defined by Congress as “revenue losses attributable 
to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or 
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of 
tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, § 3, 88 Stat. 297, 299 (1974). 
 57 Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 
COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 3 (2012). 
 58 This is what the U.K. does. See infra discussion at note 152. 
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allowing individual donors to take deductions for their gifts to 
those charities.59 The subsidy in the deduction is equal to the 
tax savings enjoyed by the individual.60  
The tax administration mechanism distinguishes tax 
expenditures from direct expenditures, even though their function 
and effect are equivalent. The government’s reporting of tax 
expenditures reflects their economic substance as spending 
programs. Every year, the Treasury Department and the Joint 
Committee on Taxation prepare lists that enumerate the cost of 
tax expenditures, as they would for appropriations. The 
Treasury’s tax expenditure budget is incorporated as one element 
in the Office of Management and Budget’s comprehensive budget 
for the federal government that includes all federal spending, 
both direct and indirect.61 Tax expenditure analysis was developed 
to provide an appropriate method to evaluate these provisions, 
identifying sections in the tax law based on statutory function, 
and demanding that tax provisions that resemble spending be 
evaluated on the same terms as spending provisions.62 Tax 
expenditure analysis was designed to be a budgetary tool, not a 
legal tool, so tax expenditure analysis does not mandate a 
particular legal methodology.63 
The state tax credit at issue in ACS precisely fits the 
established definition of a tax expenditure. It is “analogous to 
[a] direct outlay program[]” and “similar to [a] direct spending 
program[] . . . available as entitlements to those who meet the 
statutory criteria.”64 It operates to reduce the tax of individuals 
who participate in the narrow program described in the 
legislation, and it has the effect of fully subsidizing the 
contributions that individuals make to the organizations specified 
in the statute. Because the statute allows a credit for the full 
amount transferred to STOs, every dollar that a taxpayer 
contributes to an STO, up to the maximum allowed by the 
statute, reduces the taxpayer’s tax liability by a full dollar. As 
an economic matter, there is no after-tax cost to individuals for 
their contributions as long as they have sufficient tax liability to 
  
 59 I.R.C. § 170 (2006). 
 60 For example, a taxpayer with a 35 percent marginal rate of tax saves $35 for 
each $100 donated to charity because the $100 deduction produces $35 in tax savings. 
 61 See ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2013, supra note 23; JOINT COMM. 
TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009–2013 
(JCS-1-10), Jan. 11, 2010 [hereinafter ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES]. 
 62 See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 25-26 (1985). 
 63 See Sugin, supra note 57, at 7. 
 64 ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 61, at 3. 
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enjoy the benefit of the credit. The state refunds, through the tax 
system, the entire amount paid to the STO. Despite this clear 
economic equivalence to government funding, the ACS Court 
flatly rejected the notion that the tax credit be “understood as a 
governmental expenditure.”65 In its legal reasoning, it refused to 
acknowledge the economic equivalence of tax expenditures and 
direct spending. Instead, the Court treated the tax credit as a 
simple tax cut. 
The disposition in the ACS case turned on standing—the 
Supreme Court denied standing to plaintiffs who were 
challenging an Arizona state tax credit66 on Establishment Clause 
grounds. The plaintiffs had alleged that the tax credit, which was 
allowed to individuals who made payments to STOs, provided an 
unconstitutional benefit to religious schools and their students.67  
  
 65 ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011). 
 66 The tax credit allowed is for 100 percent of payments to a qualified 
organization, up to a maximum of $1000 (for married tax filers). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43-1089 (2010). The credit is not refundable for filers with insufficient tax liability to 
absorb the credit. 
 67 The statute governing STOs, Arizona Code § 43-1603, provides:  
A. A certified school tuition organization must be established to receive 
contributions from taxpayers for the purposes of income tax credits under 
§ 43-1089 and to pay educational scholarships or tuition grants to allow 
students to attend any qualified school of their parents’ choice. 
B. To be eligible for certification and retain certification, the school tuition 
organization: 
1. Must allocate at least ninety per cent of its annual revenue for 
educational scholarships or tuition grants. 
2. Shall not limit the availability of educational scholarships or tuition 
grants to only students of one school. 
3. May allow donors to recommend student beneficiaries, but shall not 
award, designate or reserve scholarships solely on the basis of donor 
recommendations. 
4. Shall not allow donors to designate student beneficiaries as a condition 
of any contribution to the organization, or facilitate, encourage or 
knowingly permit the exchange of beneficiary student designations in 
violation of § 43-1089, subsection F. 
C. A school tuition organization shall include the following notice in any printed 
materials soliciting donations, in applications for scholarships and on its website: 
Notice 
A school tuition organization cannot award, restrict or reserve scholarships 
solely on the basis of a donor’s recommendation. 
A taxpayer may not claim a tax credit if the taxpayer agrees to swap 
donations with another taxpayer to benefit either taxpayer’s own dependent. 
D. In evaluating applications and awarding, designating or reserving 
scholarships, a school tuition organization: 
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This article does not focus on the standing issue. 
Instead, it argues that the ACS decision is important because 
its novel treatment of tax expenditures will have significant 
repercussions for tax policy and law. Even though tax 
expenditures have the same economic effect as direct 
government spending, and may have been adopted as functional 
substitutes for direct spending, the Supreme Court has now 
characterized them as “the government declin[ing] to impose a 
tax.”68 This characterization turns tax expenditures into 
legislative forbearance, rather than affirmative policy choices 
contained in tax provisions. It transforms tax expenditures into 
decisions by the legislature not to tax. This is a critical 
conceptual shift: tax expenditures have become tax cuts. The 
Court’s rejection of economic analysis into legal analysis is not 
too surprising,69 but its decision to treat tax expenditures as tax 
cuts is new and important. 
The effect of the ACS decision could be substantial 
because the Court’s reasoning threatens to make federal tax 
expenditures disappear from legal analysis altogether. This 
new characterization of tax expenditures as tax cuts logically 
extends beyond state tax credits such as the one at issue, to the 
judicial treatment of all tax expenditures, state and federal. 
While the credit in ACS concerned only $43 million in Arizona 
revenue,70 at the federal level, the judicial conceptualization of 
tax expenditures applies to the equivalent of a trillion dollars of 
  
1. Shall not award, designate or reserve a scholarship solely on the 
recommendation of any person contributing money to the organization, 
but may consider the recommendation among other factors. 
2. Shall consider the financial need of applicants. 
E. A qualified school shall not accept an educational scholarship or tuition 
grant from a school tuition organization in an amount that exceeds the 
school’s total cost of educating the student in whose name the scholarship or 
grant is received. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1603 (2010). 
 68 ACS, 131 S. Ct. at 1447. 
 69 The Court never fully adopted tax expenditure analysis as a legal 
framework, which is why tax-based assistance to churches is constitutional, even 
though direct aid is not. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 680 
(1970) (tax exemption to churches was not a violation of the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment). I have previously argued against constitutionalizing tax 
expenditure analysis. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures Analysis and Constitutional 
Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 412-13 (1999). 
 70 STATE OF ARIZONA, DEP’T OF REVENUE, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CREDIT 
FOR DONATIONS TO PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION ORGANIZATIONS: REPORTING FOR 2010, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at http://www.azdor.gov/Portals/0/Reports/ 
private-school-tax-credit-report-2010.pdf. 
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federal spending annually.71 The Court’s approach places an 
enormous number of statutory provisions on a protected legal 
pedestal by shielding them from constitutional review for 
violations of individual rights.  
Without the economic framework of tax expenditure 
analysis, tax credits produce an opaque reduction in the tax 
liability of some individuals. The problem with the ACS 
majority’s approach is that an opaque reduction eludes legal 
analysis; it ignores the existence of the public policy that a 
targeted tax reduction reflects. Such a nebulous “tax cut” 
cannot be reviewed, whether it is structured as state aid to 
religion or anything else. It was only possible for the ACS 
Court to dismiss the case because it treated the credit as the 
absence of tax—a big legal nothing. 
C. Economic vs. Legal Analysis of Taxes and Tax Cuts 
The debate about the definition of taxes and tax cuts is 
confused, in part, because tax scholars commonly assume that 
economic equivalents must be legal equivalents. Tax scholars, 
both economists and lawyers, regularly engage in economic 
analysis, so perhaps they should be forgiven for thinking that 
economic effects should control legal results. The classic tax 
policy criteria of efficiency demands economic analysis, so tax 
lawyers have adopted economic criteria into legal discourse.72  
The debate between the NFIB majority and dissent fails 
to fit the framework usually applied by tax scholars because 
the distinction between taxes, on the one hand, and regulation 
accompanied by a penalty, on the other, is legal, not economic. 
The substance of the individual mandate to purchase health 
insurance could have been designed either as direct regulation 
or as a tax, with the same function and effect. A parallel issue 
arises in distinguishing tax benefits from government spending, 
so the ACS decision is also an example of the conflict between 
legal and economic analysis. In that case, the Arizona credit 
could have been designed as direct state funding for private 
school tuition with the same function and effect as the tax 
credit, but economic equivalence was not a meaningful part of 
the Court’s legal analysis. The established jurisprudence on tax 
  
 71 See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34622, TAX 
EXPENDITURES AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 13 (2011). 
 72 I have argued that efficiency receives too much deference in tax 
scholarship. See Sugin, supra note 57, at 35-36. 
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expenditures confirms that form often controls substance when 
the Court reviews tax-based benefits.73 Prior to ACS, the 
constitutional treatment of tax expenditures had been nuanced: 
economic equivalence did not necessarily imply legal equivalence, 
but it was not irrelevant either. Rather, economic equivalence was 
considered evidence of government support, one element relevant 
in determining legal consequences.74 After ACS, tax provisions 
that benefit religious institutions through a credit are now 
immune from legal attack, even where other provisions with the 
same effect would not only be subject to judicial review, but likely 
adjudicated to be unconstitutional on the merits. 
For NFIB, Professor Edward Kleinbard urged the Court 
to uphold the mandate as a tax by basing his argument on the 
economic substance of the shared responsibility payment.75 He 
reconceptualized the mandate as a tax on everyone, with an 
associated “notional tax credit” for those who acquire health 
insurance.76 His characterization posits an increased tax for all, 
accompanied by an offsetting reduction for certain qualified 
individuals through a tax expenditure. As a result, the statute 
in NFIB was transformed into something that looked like the 
statute at issue in ACS where Arizona imposes a tax only on 
people who do not make payments to STOs.77 In other words, 
the net effect of the increased tax with the notional credit is a 
liability only for those who are not entitled to the credit. 
Economically, Kleinbard’s description is accurate—the notional 
tax credit combined with a universal tax would be economically 
equivalent to what actually exists in the law—a tax payment to 
be made only by individuals who fail to acquire health 
insurance. The mistake that Kleinbard made is not economic; it 
is legal. He assumed that the Court would treat the imposition 
of additional tax—say, a general rate increase—along with a tax 
credit the same way that it would treat a targeted levy charged 
only to a few individuals. His economic characterization is 
undeniably correct, but he mistakenly believed that economic 
  
 73 Part III.D, infra, develops this point. 
 74 See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text. 
 75 See Edward D. Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, 128 TAX NOTES 755, 
755-56 (2010). He also contributed to one of the briefs submitted to the court: Brief for 
Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Minimum 
Coverage Provision), Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1133 (2012) 
(No. 11-398), 2012 WL 135050. 
 76 Edward D. Kleinbard, The Taxing Power and the ACA: Cravenness Is Not 
Unconstitutional, HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2012, 4:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
edward-d-kleinbard/the-taxing-power-and-the-_b_1635361.html. 
 77 Id. 
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equivalents are legal equivalents, which the Supreme Court has 
made amply clear is not the case.78 
Kleinbard compared NFIB to ACS, as this article does, 
but came out in a different place. He rationalized the two cases 
by arguing that they are both examples of avoiding taxes by 
spending one’s own money. That financial characterization may 
apply to both cases, but the Court’s legal conclusions cannot be 
made consistent on those grounds. Kleinbard described the 
ACS majority as treating the law in that case as “just another 
tax,” putting it in the same category as the mandate. But that 
is not an accurate reading of what the Court actually did in 
ACS.79 The Court there refused to treat the Arizona statute as a 
tax. It also declined to treat the credit as its economic 
equivalent, government spending. Instead, the Court’s legal 
conclusion was that the spending was solely private individual 
action. The Court’s refusal to treat the statute as a tax was 
crucial because the constitutional claim in ACS concerned 
religious freedom, not the commerce power. Adoption pursuant 
to the taxing power would not have been enough to uphold the 
statute because the Establishment Clause limits the 
government’s power to tax. 
NFIB recognizes that Congress may tax even where it 
may not constitutionally regulate under the Commerce Clause. 
The Supreme Court, however, has never declared that taxes 
are completely immune from constitutional limitations, and the 
NFIB opinion confirmed that they are not. The majority stated 
that the affirmative prohibitions on the government’s power, 
“such as contained in the Bill of Rights[,] . . . come into 
play . . . where the Government possesses authority to act.”80 
Thus, taxes authorized by Article I, Section 8 may not tread on 
individual rights. The prohibition on establishment of religion 
extends to establishment through taxation, even though an 
absence of power under the commerce clause has no effect on 
Congress’s tax power. Similarly, the actions of state legislatures, 
which are not limited by constitutionally enumerated powers, 
are still subject to limitation by the Bill of Rights. Justice 
Roberts’ NFIB opinion noted that states may not deny equal 
protection of the laws to any person.81 Consequently, a tax 
imposed only on individuals of a particular race or of certain 
  
 78 See infra Part III.D. 
 79 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 80 NFIB, No. 11-393, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 28, 2012).  
 81 Id. 
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religious denominations, whether adopted by Congress or one 
of the states, would be unconstitutional. Even something 
clearly identified as a tax and clearly within the powers of the 
government, must still withstand scrutiny under the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment. Thus, the constitutional 
question in NFIB was fundamentally different from the 
constitutional question in ACS: NFIB concerned Congress’s 
enumerated constitutional powers, whereas ACS concerned the 
limitations imposed on those enumerated powers by the Bill of 
Rights. If the ACS Court had characterized the provision as 
“just another tax,” it would have needed to face the 
constitutional question. Instead, the ACS Court characterized 
the tax credit as an absence of taxation. Because the Court 
concluded that the legislature did nothing, it was not subject to 
any constitutional limitations. Economic analysis fails to 
provide clarity for these legal issues. 
II. HOW THE COURT MADE TAXES AND TAX EXPENDITURES 
CONSTITUTIONALLY EXCEPTIONAL 
This part argues that the Court’s new rulings on the tax 
law are likely to have troubling legal repercussions. The most 
worrisome aspect of the Court’s holdings is that tax expenditures 
disappear from the legal regime; they become essentially 
unreviewable as a constitutional matter because the Court’s 
characterization denies the presence of any reviewable state 
action. If the ACS Court’s approach is adopted broadly as the 
judicial treatment of tax expenditures, the ramifications will 
extend beyond the context of standing in Establishment Clause 
cases to the legal substance of tax expenditures more generally. 
The decision on tax expenditures also threatens to destabilize 
the accepted precedent on the constitutionality of restrictions 
attached to tax benefits.  
Part III explores the policy ramifications of this legal 
development. From a policy perspective, the Court’s expansive 
interpretation of the taxing power and hands-off approach to tax 
expenditures encourage increased policymaking of all sorts in 
the tax law. This is precisely the opposite of what tax reformers 
advocate because tax expenditures often create problems of 
inequity and inefficiency. In particular, dollar-for-dollar 
nonrefundable credits should not be encouraged because they 
constitute irresponsible budgeting by states, and allow economic 
and political advantages to flow inequitably to some individuals, 
while leaving others out. The Court’s decisions undermine the 
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integrity of the tax law, making it harder to raise the revenue 
needed to address the country’s fiscal challenges. 
A. Taxation Is More Powerful Than Regulation, but Tax 
Cuts Are More Popular 
The NFIB decision emphasizes Congress’s power to tax 
where it cannot constitutionally regulate. This privileges 
taxation over direct regulation and encourages regulatory 
taxation even where direct regulation would be a more effective 
alternative. Post-NFIB, Congress might choose to tax and 
thereby allow deleterious activities to proceed, even where 
prohibition would be better social policy. Nevertheless, the 
Court’s invitation in NFIB to regulate with taxation is not 
excessively alarming because Congress is unlikely to seize the 
opportunity. In the Affordable Care Act, Congress used the 
taxing power to regulate beyond the powers of the Commerce 
Clause. In order to do that, however, it had to increase taxes on 
individuals, which it generally avoids at all costs, and the 
continuing public disapproval of the individual mandate 
provision82 explains why. The political unpopularity of 
increased taxation is likely to constrain the regulation by 
taxation of “all private conduct” that the NFIB dissenters 
worried about.83 The shared responsibility payment stands out 
as one of very few tax increases passed by Congress in recent 
years. As long as raising taxes remains politically unpopular, 
NFIB’s confirmation of the expansiveness of Congress’s tax 
power is unlikely to produce many new and onerous taxes.  
From a legal perspective, the ACS opinion’s conflation of 
tax cuts with government spending is more significant than the 
NFIB opinion’s definition of a tax. While the NFIB opinion 
followed precedent on the scope of the tax power, the ACS 
opinion broke new ground in treating tax expenditures as tax 
cuts. The practical effects of the ACS opinion are also likely to 
be more significant. The twenty-first century Congress is one of 
tax cutters, not tax raisers.84 The Court’s rejection of tax 
  
 82 In July 2012, after the Court upheld the ACA, sixty-three percent of people 
surveyed had an unfavorable view of the mandate. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: PUBLIC OPINION ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES 6 
(July 2012), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8339-F.pdf. 
 83 See NFIB, No. 11-393, slip op. at 2 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, 
JJ., dissenting). 
 84 See, e.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).  
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expenditure analysis in its legal reasoning is likely to 
encourage legislatures to engage in irresponsible behavior. The 
ACS decision created a protected legal space for tax 
expenditures as compared to their direct spending equivalents, 
and effectively constitutionalized the definition of tax 
expenditures, immunizing them from judicial review. The ACS 
decision invites legislatures to tread upon the Bill of Rights 
with impunity, and they might be politically tempted to do so 
because they can claim to be cutting taxes. Now that tax 
expenditures share the legal status of tax cuts, legislatures will 
be tempted to multiply the programs they administer through 
the tax law, all the while proclaiming their generosity in 
passing politically popular tax cuts.  
The Court’s analysis in ACS was more complex than its 
analysis in NFIB on account of the distinction between the 
relevant constitutional issues. The central issue in NFIB was 
whether the mandate was a tax authorized by Article I, Section 
8’s power to tax. As soon as the majority determined that it 
was, the inquiry was largely finished.85 If the ACS majority had 
concluded that the statute at issue in that case was a tax, the 
inquiry would have needed an additional step. A tax would 
have been legislative action subject to limitation by the 
Establishment Clause, so the legal analysis would have 
proceeded to evaluate the constitutional question. The same 
analysis would have been required if the Court had 
characterized the credit as its economically equivalent public 
spending program because federal spending is also subject to 
the constraints of the Establishment Clause. But the Court’s 
legal reasoning in ACS rejected both the tax characterization 
and the spending characterization; the tax credit was neither 
taxing nor spending by the legislature, but rather legislative 
forbearance, so the state did nothing constitutionally important 
when it allowed taxpayers to reduce their tax bills. The Court’s 
characterization allowed it to dispense with the First Amendment 
analysis, whereas both taxing and spending would have been 
subject to further review.  
Portraying tax expenditures as an absence of taxation, 
as the ACS Court did for purposes of standing, spills over into 
the substantive law evaluation of tax expenditures. Because 
  
 85 A secondary question relating to that authority was whether the 
Commerce Clause imposes any limitations on Congress’s enumerated taxing power. 
The NFIB court concluded that it did not, which kept the constitutional analysis of the 
tax simple. NFIB, slip op. at 43-44. 
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the consequence of the legislature declining to tax is that the 
state does not do anything of legal significance when it adopts a 
tax expenditure, the Court’s account of tax expenditures negates 
any allegation of state action in support of religion from tax 
credits. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Court described 
the subsidy to religion in ACS as private, rather than public.86 If 
the legislature has declined to act, there can be no allocation of 
public funds, so there is no legal issue. The state is not the 
decision-maker in the Court’s analysis, so any religion-supporting 
action is private action and not subject to constitutional 
limitation; individual taxpayers decide to contribute their own 
money to the scholarship organizations so they are the agents 
supporting religion. If this analysis is extended to all tax 
expenditures, then tax expenditures only implicate private 
action, which is not subject to constitutional constraints. This 
is why the ACS opinion shields tax expenditures from 
constitutional review, elevating tax expenditures to a 
constitutional status, even where taxes would remain subject to 
constitutional limits. 
B. The Court Takes A Literal Approach to Taxing and 
Spending Under Flast v. Cohen 
A more detailed parsing of the Court’s 2011 decision in 
ACS is necessary to fully understand the implications of the 
holding. The plaintiffs in ACS claimed access to the courts as 
taxpayers under the Court’s precedent in Flast v. Cohen,87 
which carved out an exception from the particularized injury 
requirement generally necessary for a plaintiff to gain access to 
judicial review. Under Flast, taxpayers—as taxpayers—have 
been allowed to challenge government support of religion as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause, even where they 
suffered no unique personal injury. The ACS decision was 
inconsistent with numerous prior cases in which the Court 
decided challenges to tax-based aid to religion on the merits,88 
often without any discussion of the standing question. Justice 
Scalia observed that the majority’s opinion in ACS eviscerated 
  
 86 ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1439 (2011). 
 87 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 88 Justice Kagan’s dissent cited many of those cases. ACS, 131 S. Ct. at 1453 
& n.2 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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the taxpayer standing authorized in Flast, essentially ending 
the era of taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases.89  
The demise of Flast—whether complete or partial—is a 
significant development and will be important to the 
jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause.90 Nevertheless, this 
article is not about the taxpayer standing rule in Flast. It’s not 
about standing at all,91 and takes no position on whether the 
majority, concurrence, or dissent in ACS had the better 
interpretation on the standing question.92 The nuances of 
Article III are better left to scholars of constitutional law. 
Rather, the analysis of Flast in ACS led the Court to its 
decision that the tax credit is constitutionally meaningless, 
since it is not “taxing and spending.” 
The Court reached the conclusion that the legislature 
declined to impose a tax by methodically working through the 
Flast standard. It demanded that plaintiffs show that taxpayer 
property is transferred through government to religion “by 
means of the taxing and spending power.”93 The notion of taxing 
and spending, as a required unit, originated with Flast because 
Flast focused on the federal government’s constitutional power 
to tax under Article I, Section 8—the same power considered by 
the Court in NFIB—but with a greater focus on the spending 
element. In Flast, the claim was that the Establishment Clause 
limited the government’s constitutional authority to spend 
funds supporting religion, and the specific issue concerned the 
direct spending of federal funds for books used by religious 
schools.94 The Flast rule was created to allow taxpayer standing 
because government funding of religion in violation of the 
  
 89 See id. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 90 The effect of narrowing the Flast rule in the law of standing could be small 
in practical effect. There are other plaintiffs with injuries that would be sufficient to 
support individual standing who can still challenge state tax credit programs on 
Establishment Clause grounds. See id. at 1457 n.7 (Kagan, J., dissenting). ACS closes 
the courthouse doors only to taxpayer plaintiffs complaining of Establishment Clause 
violations—claims that would have previously been heard, but would not have been the 
only claims to attack the type of program in Arizona. Thus, while the holding on 
standing was surprising and new, the practical importance of the Court’s decision on 
the standing issue may be limited. 
 91 In a forthcoming project, I will make some observations about when taxpayer 
standing might be necessary to address Establishment Clause issues in the tax system. See 
Linda Sugin, When Taxpayer Standing Really Matters (Mar. 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review). 
 92 The majority narrowed the Flast rule to deny the plaintiffs’ standing, the 
concurrence would have explicitly overruled Flast, and the dissent would have allowed 
the plaintiffs to proceed under Flast’s exception. 
 93 ACS, 131 S. Ct. at 1438 (majority opinion).  
 94 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1968). 
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Establishment Clause related to the plaintiff’s status as a 
taxpayer and created a taxpayer-relevant injury. The Flast 
court did not dwell on the taxing aspect of the government’s 
action because whenever there is direct spending for particular 
purposes, it assumed the tax step would precede it—the 
government has nothing to spend if it does not collect any 
revenue.95 Even though state-law decisions to tax and spend are 
not governed by Article I, Section 8, the Flast standard for 
allowing taxpayer plaintiffs to challenge state decisions to tax and 
spend has been adopted into the jurisprudence of federal court 
review of state law, and the Establishment Clause has been 
understood to limit state decisions in the same manner as federal 
decisions.96 Consequently, the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
taxing and spending is relevant to determining what falls under 
the Flast standard for state law challenges like the one in ACS. It 
is also relevant to the issue of state action, which is necessary for 
constitutional limits to apply in any case. 
In ACS, the Court adopted a highly literal 
interpretation of the Flast standard—requiring both taxing and 
spending for application of Establishment Clause standing. 
Under that approach, money must actually be collected and 
then disbursed, in separate steps. Neither of those steps occur 
for tax expenditures; there is no “extraction” separate from 
“spending” with tax expenditures. Thus, tax expenditures seem 
to fall through the cracks of the possible categories that might be 
subject to judicial review, even though they could reasonably be 
legally categorized as taxing, spending, or both. Tax expenditure 
analysis, the mode of thinking about tax provisions as spending 
equivalents, is necessary to find that both extraction and 
spending have taken place. It explains how tax expenditures 
accomplish the result of both taxing and spending 
simultaneously, by foregoing revenue that would have 
otherwise been collected under the law. Tax expenditure 
analysis would treat tax credits like the one in ACS as 
spending provisions by relying on the economic equivalence of 
the credit and direct spending on scholarship programs.  
Since the Court was reticent to employ economic 
analysis to treat the STO credit as legally equivalent to direct 
spending, it could have instead subjected the statute to review 
  
 95 Deficit financing refutes this, but the Flast Court accepted the taxing 
element without discussion. Id. at 102-06. 
 96 See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a 
(Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 794 (2003). 
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as a tax. An expansive notion of what constitutes a tax would 
be consistent with the Court’s approach in NFIB. Like the 
individual mandate, the Arizona credit was in the state’s tax 
statute, administered by the state’s taxing authorities, and 
accounted for on taxpayer returns. Tax expenditure analysis, 
however, rejects the tax characterization because tax credits 
like the one in Arizona fit poorly into the definition of a tax for 
other purposes. For example, the Supreme Court has long 
defined a tax in terms of revenue collection—this was one of 
the reasons it found the shared responsibility payment to be a 
tax in NFIB97—but tax credits reduce revenue. Revenue has 
been an important touchstone for defining a tax under the Tax 
Injunction Act,98 which bars federal courts from interfering with 
the collection of tax by the states.99 In fact, the ACS litigation 
itself had a prior visit to the Supreme Court in 2004, and the 
majority in that decision held that the Tax Injunction Act did 
not bar review by the federal court because the challenge to the 
credit would not “impede Arizona’s receipt of tax revenues.”100 
The Court there refused to treat the whole “state tax system” 
as a tax under the Tax Injunction Act,101 paving the way for 
treating the credit as spending. But the author of that earlier 
opinion dissented in the later ACS decision, which rejected the 
spending characterization in favor of treating the credit as 
declining to tax.  
C. The ACS Court Makes an Economic and a Legal Mistake 
The ACS Court’s reasoning was based on two mistakes. 
The first mistake was economic: the Court treated individuals 
as spending their own money to support STOs even though 
there is no economic burden on taxpayers who “support” STOs. 
It is not necessary to adopt tax expenditure analysis into 
judicial reasoning to reject that conclusion. The second was 
legal: the Court treated the taxpayers’ decision to send money 
to STOs as legally relevant, whereas the legislature’s decision 
to adopt the tax credit should have been the central legal 
  
 97 NFIB, No. 11-393, slip op. at 33 (U.S. June 28, 2012). 
 98 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 99 NFIB also involved a tax injunction issue, under the federal Anti-
Injunction Act. The Court concluded that the mandate was not a tax for purposes of 
that statute, allowing it to reach the merits of the case. That holding is consistent with 
the revenue focus because it effectively allows Congress to determine whether it will be 
subject to suits that interfere with revenue collection. See NFIB, slip op. at 11-15. 
 100 Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 92 (2004).  
 101 Id. at 94.  
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question. These mistakes together led the majority to the 
conclusion that the case involved private action of no 
constitutional concern. It was a short step from the Court’s 
statement that the credit is a decision to decline to impose a tax, 
to its ultimate conclusion that taxpayers claiming the credit 
simply “spend their own money.”102 Pursuant to the Court’s 
approach, where the legislature has declined to impose a tax, it 
has no revenue to spend, so any transfer must come from private 
sources. Because the entire transaction is the private business of 
taxpayers, those claiming the tax credit are separate and apart 
from the rest of Arizona’s taxpayers under this approach.103  
The conclusion that taxpayers who contribute to STOs 
and claim the attendant tax credit are “spend[ing] their own 
money” rests on a tortured understanding of what it means to 
“spend” one’s own money. Spending one’s own money generally 
implies that the spender has less of it after the expense. While 
Arizona taxpayers claiming the credit do physically send their 
checks to the STOs, they are no poorer for doing so because 
every dollar that a taxpayer spends on an STO—up to the 
maximum creditable amount—is reimbursed by the state. 
Individuals suffer no net outlay from personal resources. This 
100 percent credit design is more generous to taxpayers than 
deductions, or even most credits. For all deductions, and most 
tax credits, the taxpayer bears an out-of-pocket cost for the 
underlying expense eligible for the tax benefit because the tax 
benefit is only part of the dollar expense necessary for claiming 
the tax benefit.104 A deduction saves a taxpayer an amount 
equal to the deducted outlay multiplied by the taxpayer’s 
marginal rate of tax. Because a deduction operates to reduce 
taxable income, rather than tax, there is always an after-tax 
cost of a deductible item.105 The only example in the federal tax 
  
 102 ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011). 
 103 The Court says, “respondents [opposed to the credit] . . . remain free to pay 
their own tax bills, without contributing to an STO,” id., implying that the issues they 
raised about the credit have nothing to do with the respondents’ tax bills, and that the tax 
bills of those claiming the credit have no effect on the taxpayers who do not claim the credit. 
 104 Unlike deductions, credits reduce tax liability by the amount of the credit. 
So a credit for $100 saves $100 in tax. In the federal tax system, however, credits are 
generally designed to offset only a part of a taxpayer’s outlay. For example, the child-
care credit in the Internal Revenue Code has a maximum of only thirty-five percent of 
the child-care expenses incurred, leaving the taxpayer with an after-tax cost of sixty-
five percent of the outlaid funds. I.R.C. § 21 (2006). 
 105 To illustrate, a $100 deduction to a taxpayer with a thirty percent 
marginal rate of tax saves that taxpayer $30 in tax; the after-tax cost to the taxpayer of 
the expense is $70 in that case. 
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law of a credit as generous as the one at issue in ACS is the 
credit for qualifying educational expenses up to $2000.106  
Spending one’s own money also usually implies 
substantial autonomy over the spending decision. The broader a 
statute’s eligible class of recipients, the more autonomy taxpayers 
would have in any spending decision. For example, if the credit 
had been available for payments to any educational institution, it 
would have given taxpayers greater autonomy. With the Arizona 
credit, there is limited autonomy over what receives support 
because the state has defined the narrow circumstances in which 
it will reimburse the contribution amount.  
In keeping with its assertion that the state is passive in 
this financing, the Court stated that awarding the credit to 
STO supporters “allows other citizens to retain control over 
their own funds in accordance with their . . . consciences.”107 
Thus, the Court suggested that private individuals can choose 
not to spend on STOs, but on something else of their choice. 
Although this is true, those individuals are worse off than those 
who contribute to STOs because they have to actually spend 
their own money without state reimbursement. They need to 
pay more money to the state in taxes because they are ineligible 
for the credit. Only the contributors to STOs are allowed to 
spend the funds as they like. Since the amount of the credit fully 
reduces the amount of tax owed, it is clear how much additional 
cash the taxpayer has available for other purposes.108  
The ACS Court’s legal mistake is more serious than its 
economic one. The opinion recognized that a government’s 
decision to collect revenue and spend it is a government 
choice,109 but it did not acknowledge that the decision to allow 
tax credits for contributions to STOs is also a government 
choice. That is why the majority treated the case as involving 
  
 106 This is the American Opportunity Tax Credit. I.R.C. § 25A(i) (extended 
through 2017 by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 P.L. 112-240 §103(a) 
(2013)). Even so, since college expenses often exceed $2000 per year, the $2000 cap on 
the 100 percent credit often requires some taxpayer outlay in addition to the amount 
reimbursed through the tax system.  
 107 ACS, 131 S. Ct. at 1447. 
 108 To illustrate, Taxpayers A and B each earn $10,000. If the tax rate 
applicable to them is five percent, then they each presumptively pay $500 in tax, 
leaving them each $9500 to spend after tax. If A gives $500 to an STO, he is entitled to 
the credit and still has $9500 after tax to spend as he likes. If B gives $500 to a needy 
person, he is not entitled to the credit. Consequently, B has only $9000 after tax to 
spend because his $500 tax liability is not diminished on account of the gift. B is out of 
pocket both the $500 tax and the $500 gift to the needy person, while A is only out of 
pocket either the $500 tax or the $500 STO payment, but not both. 
 109 ACS, 131 S. Ct. at 1438. 
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only private decisions, rather than state action.110 Government 
choice extends beyond the narrowest categories of taxing and 
spending to include the myriad ways that government influences 
private action. All legislation is the product of government 
choice; the Arizona legislature made the choice to adopt the 
enabling legislation authorizing STOs,111 and it also made the 
choice to adopt the tax credit that is so important in funding 
them.112 Arizona’s data indicates that only a miniscule 
percentage of all funds received by STOs are in excess of tax-
credited donations, so almost all STO funding, in fact, comes 
from foregone taxes.113  
The state’s role in administering and regulating STOs is 
also substantial. STOs are certified and listed on the Department 
of Revenue’s website.114 The tax credit that helps to finance STOs 
is implemented by the state through the apparatus of the state 
taxing authorities. Like nonprofit organizations generally, 
STOs are privately controlled by trustees. The fact that there is 
“no state intervention”115 in the internal operations of individual 
STOs, however, is not particularly meaningful where the 
legislated requirements for eligibility largely dictate the 
business of such organizations.116 The state’s role in inducing 
private parties to organize and support STOs should be 
included in any assessment of the private role of individuals 
compared to the public role with respect to these organizations. 
While it is true that the government does not force anyone to 
send money to STOs or to take the credit for such outlays, 
creating a powerful incentive to do so was a legislative choice.  
  
 110 The Court treats the STOs and their financing as private matters, 
undertaken by citizens rather than the state. Id. at 1439. 
 111 See supra note 67. 
 112 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (2012). 
 113 See ARIZ. DEP’T OF REVENUE, PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION ORGANIZATION 
INCOME TAX CREDITS IN ARIZONA: A SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY FY 2011, at 2, available at 
http://www.azdor.gov/Portals/0/Reports/2011-Private-School-Tuition-Organization-
Individual-and-Corporate-Income-Tax-Credit-Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) 
(“[t]wenty-eight STOs reported that their revenue equaled their donations, meaning 
that they had no non-tax credit revenue”); id. at 23 (App. II) (showing revenues in 
excess of tax credit donations). 
 114 See OFFICE OF ECON. RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, ARIZ. DEP’T OF REVENUE, SCHOOL 
TUITION ORGANIZATIONS CERTIFIED TO RECEIVE DONATIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME 
TAX CREDITS (Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://www.azdor.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket= 
4LCbUS0EE4w%3d&tabid=114. It also has a manual for participation. OFFICE OF ECON. 
RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, ARIZ. DEP’T OF REVENUE, MANUAL FOR SCHOOL TUITION 
ORGANIZATIONS (June 22, 2012), available at https://www.azscholarships.org/ 
Media/School+Tuition+Organization+Manual_062212.pdf. 
 115 ACS, 131 S. Ct. at 1448. 
 116 See supra note 67 for the enabling statute. 
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D. Tax Benefits Should Be Subject to Constitutional Scrutiny 
I have previously argued that “the government’s role in 
providing tax benefits should always be evaluated as state 
action,”117 even though that evaluation does not always result in 
a finding of unconstitutional state action. The key to the legal 
analysis of the state’s role depends on whether the statute 
reflects general principles. The price for government immunity 
on account of individual choice demands that the government 
may not too narrowly draw the contours of the beneficiaries.118 
Constitutionality depends on a substantive review of the state’s 
program, along with an inquiry into any related independent 
decisions made by individuals. Individual agency can interrupt 
the effects of legislative actions so that private choices are more 
significant than public choices in determining outcomes, but 
only if that choice is meaningful. Where the statutory limits 
are wide, taxpayer action is more meaningful and it is much 
harder to argue that the government is supporting particular 
organizations. If a statute provides broad contours with numerous 
interpretations to be filled in by individuals, then the individual’s 
role is legally significant and holds more weight, thus the overall 
scheme would be less likely to reflect government control over 
funding. In other words, wide entitlements to government 
benefits that are available to all citizens are more likely to be 
constitutionally acceptable than narrower ones, even where some 
recipients of those benefits are religious.119  
The law has long been clear that tax expenditures are not 
necessarily legally equivalent to direct spending, even where 
they are economic equivalents.120 As a result, the Supreme Court 
is more accepting of tax-based aid to religion over its direct 
spending equivalent.121 Consequently, if the ACS Court had 
reviewed the substance of the Arizona statute, the plaintiffs may 
well have lost the case under established precedent on tax-based 
aid to religion.122 The judicial inquiry is nuanced, and courts 
  
 117 Sugin, supra note 69, at 433 (emphasis omitted). 
 118 Id. at 437-38. 
 119 Id. at 437. 
 120 Id.  
 121 The leading case is Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) 
(upholding property tax exemption for churches); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 
388 (1983) (upholding deduction for school costs for all taxpayers). 
 122 Another iteration of the challenge to the Arizona tax credit upheld it on 
substantive grounds. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 625 (1999). The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in that case. See Kotterman v. Killian, 528 U.S. 921 (1999); 
Rhodes v. Killian, 528 U.S. 810 (1999). 
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exercise judgment about which economically equivalent cases 
are legally equivalent. A tax expenditure constitutes a 
government establishment of religion only if it fails to satisfy the 
substantive elements of constitutionality: secular purpose, no 
primary effect of advancing religion, and no excessive 
entanglement of government with religion.123 If government 
action is superseded by meaningful individual choice, a tax 
expenditure can be constitutional where its equivalent direct 
appropriation subsidy would not.124  
In the substantive Establishment Clause analysis, the 
message of government support for religion can be more 
important than that of economic support,125 so the purposes that 
are evident in the statute may outweigh the economic 
consequences of its implementation. Furthermore, tax-based aid 
generally has less entanglement with religion than direct aid, so 
it more easily avoids Establishment Clause problems.126 Under 
this substantive criteria, the ACS facts favor the state. First, 
the statute is neutral with respect to religious and secular 
schools; there is no mention of religious organizations 
anywhere in the legislation. And second, the STOs stand 
between the state and the religious schools so that no money 
flows directly from state coffers to religious organizations. 
These distinctions are important to the substantive constitutional 
evaluation of Establishment Clause claims, so the ACS majority 
did not need to characterize tax expenditures as tax cuts or 
private spending to uphold the STO credit. For these reasons, the 
plaintiffs would likely have lost on the merits if the Supreme 
Court had reached them, despite the fact of economic equivalence.  
The taxpayer’s own out-of-pocket, after-tax cost elevates 
the role of individuals relative to the state because it tips the 
legal balance further towards individual purposefulness. For 
example, under the federal charitable contribution deduction127 
the financial commitment that the taxpayer must make to 
garner the state’s contribution is substantial.128 Thus, there 
might be enough individual agency to separate the state from 
  
 123 These are described in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
 124 See Sugin, supra note 69, at 437, 446, 461. 
 125 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 584-85 (1992); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 678 (1984); see also Sugin, supra note 69, at 465. 
 126 See Sugin, supra note 69, at 466-67. 
 127 I.R.C. § 170 (2006). 
 128 The top marginal rate under current law is thirty-five percent, so any 
contribution deducted under § 170 leaves the taxpayer with a sixty-five percent after-
tax cost. Appreciated property is an exception to this because gain is untaxed while fair 
market value is deducted. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c) (2012). 
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the charitable recipient.129 For the Arizona tax credit, the 
individual plays a purely ministerial role in choosing the STO 
to which the government’s reimbursement will be paid. The 
individual is merely a conduit for the government funds, so 
both individual agency and individual cost are very limited. 
By describing the support of STOs as purely private 
decisions of individuals, the ACS majority appeared confused 
about the nature of the plaintiffs’ complaints. The opinion 
states, “any injury suffered by respondents would not be 
remedied by an injunction limiting the tax credit’s operation.”130 
This statement indicates that the majority imposed a private 
action perspective onto the complaint. But the plaintiffs were 
not challenging private support for STOs; they were 
challenging the tax credit’s public subsidy of that private 
support. Since the Court refused to recognize the tax credit as 
public support, however, the majority did not acknowledge 
their grievance. Enjoining application of the tax credit would 
certainly have addressed their concerns. 
The Court’s interpretation of government action and 
private action understated the significance of government 
actions in shaping policies, while simultaneously overstating 
the private nature of actions that would be unlikely to occur 
without the government’s intervention. Should the Supreme 
Court insist that there be absolutely no discretion by citizens in 
order to be considered a statutory scheme reviewable as 
government action, it would ignore the most effective regulatory 
tool of taxation, which is precisely what it upheld in NFIB.  
E. Treating Tax Expenditures as Tax Cuts Jeopardizes Settled 
Law Permitting Conditions Attached to Tax Benefits 
If tax benefits are no longer to be understood as 
government spending for favored activities, the law’s limits are 
not attached to government largesse, but to private actions. 
Congress has chosen to limit the benefits flowing from tax 
expenditures in various ways, and the Supreme Court has long 
allowed those limitations. The Court has held that government 
may condition its own generosity on recipients’ surrender of 
constitutional rights, even where it would be unconstitutional 
  
 129 The Supreme Court has specifically upheld charitable exemptions and 
deductions for religious organizations. See generally Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 
397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 130 ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011). 
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to limit the actions of private persons. The jurisprudence of 
these limitations rests on the Court’s characterization of tax 
expenditures as public subsidy and government privileges. The 
ACS Court’s reasoning threatens to undermine the law of 
constitutional conditions on government benefits that are 
administered through the tax law because it disturbs the 
subsidy-privilege paradigm. If tax expenditures are no longer 
treated as government privileges, then the conditions the 
government imposes on them would no longer be constitutional. 
In prior cases, the Supreme Court recognized that tax 
expenditures function as the equivalent of direct government 
spending. The leading authority on this issue is Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation (TWR),131 though the ACS 
majority’s reasoning destabilizes that precedent. In TWR, a 
nonprofit organization challenged the lobbying limitations in 
§ 501(c)(3) of the Code.132 It claimed that the lobbying limitations 
on exempt charitable organizations were unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment,133 an argument that the Court rejected. 
The organization was allowed to lobby through an affiliate not 
organized as a charity for tax purposes,134 but not as a substantial 
part of its own charitable activities. The Court focused on the 
benefit of exemption under § 501(c)(3): only § 501(c)(3) 
organizations are eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions 
on the condition that the organization adheres to rigorous 
statutory limits on lobbying. The issue in the case was whether it 
was constitutional to condition the deductibility of donor 
contributions on how strictly the organization limited its lobbying. 
The Court determined that it passed constitutional muster, even 
though lobbying is constitutionally protected speech.  
The characterization of the charitable exemption/deduction 
as a subsidy for § 501(c)(3) organizations was the linchpin in the 
decision. It allowed the Court to uphold the political limitations 
on charitable organizations by concluding, “Congress has merely 
refused to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys.”135 Although 
Justice Rehnquist did not use the term “tax expenditure” in the 
  
 131 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash. (TWR), 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
 132 That section describes organizations exempt from tax (and eligible to 
receive deductible contributions) to require that “no substantial part of the activities of 
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence 
legislation . . . and which does not participate in, or intervene in . . . any political 
campaign . . . .” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 133 There was also an equal protection claim not relevant to the issue here. 
 134 The affiliate was a social welfare organization, exempt from tax under § 501(c)(4), 
but not eligible to receive deductible contributions from donors. TWR, 461 U.S. at 543. 
 135 Id. at 545. 
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majority opinion, he unmistakably adopted the lessons of tax 
expenditure analysis. He wrote: 
Both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is 
administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the 
same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it 
would have to pay on its income. Deductible contributions are similar to 
cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual’s contributions.136 
It was important in the case that Taxation with 
Representation could forego its § 501(c)(3) status and engage in 
lobbying, or have a non-charitable affiliate lobbying with non-
deductible contributions. The price for lobbying was that no 
deduction would be allowed for its contributors.137 The Court’s 
holding that the restriction on substantial lobbying was not an 
unconstitutional condition on free speech depended on the Court’s 
characterization of the restriction, and it did not treat the loss of 
the donor deduction as a penalty on exercising a constitutional 
right. Instead, it treated the grant of the exemption as a 
privilege that could have conditions attached.  
Similarly, in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, the D.C. 
Circuit decided that § 501(c)(3)’s restriction on political 
campaign activity of charities, including churches, was not an 
unconstitutional condition burdening the free exercise of 
religion.138 In that case, a church had sponsored a Presidential 
campaign advertisement and solicited tax-deductible contributions 
on the face of the ad.139 The government revoked the church’s 
§ 501(c)(3) status and its ability to receive deductible contributions 
from donors.140 The court upheld the exemption revocation on tax 
expenditure analysis reasoning, treating the charitable deduction 
as a benefit that could be constitutionally conditioned on refraining 
from engaging in political campaigns.141 Judge Buckley 
explained that the church’s free exercise right was not itself 
burdened by the loss of the exemption; the lost exemption 
reduced the money available to the church, but did not require 
that the church do anything contrary to its religious beliefs.142 
  
 136 Id. at 544. 
 137 Section 501(c)(4) organizations are allowed to engage in substantial 
lobbying. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (2012). 
 138 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 139 Id. at 140. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 142. 
 142 Id. (“[T]he Church does not maintain that a withdrawal from electoral 
politics would violate its beliefs. The sole effect of the loss of the tax exemption will be 
to decrease the amount of money available to the Church for its religious practices.”). 
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The church could still engage in political campaign activity if it 
felt compelled to do so. However, it could not both retain its 
§ 501(c)(3) status and engage in politicking.143 It was important 
to the holding that the statute did not require that the church 
or its members engage in any religiously proscribed activity, 
which would have been unconstitutional.144 Instead, the statute 
withdrew a “conditional privilege for failure to meet the 
condition.”145 Branch Ministries clarified the jurisprudence of 
unconstitutional conditions on tax benefits by distinguishing 
between (1) requiring that a person do something proscribed by 
his religious conviction—which is not legally permissible—and 
(2) limiting constitutionally protected activity as a condition on 
a tax-based benefit—which is legally permissible.  
These two cases make clear that as long as there is a 
“privilege,” it can be conditioned on waiving constitutional 
rights.146 But if tax expenditures are legislatures declining to 
act, as the ACS majority believed, then there is no way to 
distinguish among different species of tax reductions for 
purposes of determining which ones can be constitutionally 
conditioned. Without tax expenditure analysis and the judicial 
treatment of the tax benefit as a form of subsidy, there is no 
privilege on which to hang a restriction. Without a government 
subsidy, the TWR court’s description of the government paying 
for lobbying makes no sense, and Branch Ministries’ “conditional 
privilege” disappears. If a tax expenditure is not a subsidy, as 
the ACS decision insisted, then the lobbying and campaign 
limitations in § 501(c)(3) may become unconstitutional 
restrictions on speech or religion. This is a consequence that the 
Court failed to consider when it reconceptualized tax 
expenditures in ACS. 
  
 143 Id. at 143-44. 
 144 This was essentially the holding of Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 515, 532 
(1958) (striking down property tax exemption required signing patriotic declaration). 
 145 Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142. 
 146 It is not clear how much Congress would be allowed to condition the 
§ 501(c)(3) exemption and whether there are any limits to the TWR doctrine. For 
example, there has been no test of whether Congress can regulate solicitation of 
charitable giving through the exemption, something that states and localities have 
been unable to do as a matter of direct regulation. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 
487 U.S. 781, 784-87 (1988). The non-political limitations in § 501(c)(3), such as the 
prohibition on private inurement, do not implicate free speech concerns and are more 
integral to the purpose of the exemption. 
2013] THE GREAT AND MIGHTY TAX LAW 811 
 
F. The ACS Decision Could Have Unintended Consequences 
The definition of a tax expenditure is not strong enough 
to bear the weight of constitutional status,147 as the Court now 
requires it to do. This is precisely why it is so troublesome for 
the Court to make tax expenditures nonreviewable simply 
because they are tax expenditures rather than actual spending 
from extracted taxes. Because the tax-cut characterization 
applies equally to all tax expenditures, ACS could resonate 
beyond the Establishment Clause and shield tax expenditures 
that are suspect under other constitutional provisions, such as 
the Equal Protection Clause.148 Justice Kagan was certainly 
right when she stated in her dissent that the Court’s ACS 
opinion offers a “one-step instruction[] to any government that 
wishes to insulate its financing of religious activity from legal 
challenge.”149 “[T]he government need follow just [the] simple 
rule—subsidize through the tax system—to preclude taxpayer 
challenges to state funding of religion.”150 But her concern, 
directed only to the standing question under Flast, was too 
narrow. The Court’s ACS opinion implies that legislation that 
can be characterized as a tax cut will be completely immune 
from constitutional scrutiny for any purpose.  
Arizona parents or children would have sufficient personal 
injury to challenge the tax credit under the rules for standing.151 
But the ACS majority’s reasoning guts the claims that would be 
made by those parents or children on the merits. Even beyond the 
standing context, the decision suggests that the children are not 
harmed by anything that the state has done. They are harmed 
instead only by the private decisions of the individuals who 
choose to organize STOs and contribute their own money to 
them. The key aspect of the majority’s opinion is that there is 
no government support in the tax credit; legislative 
forbearance, from their perspective, lacks both the policy 
purpose and the financial baseline necessary to constitute 
  
 147 I discussed this at length in Sugin, supra note 69, and argued that 
structural provisions of the tax should not be immune from constitutional review. 
 148 For a discussion of equal protection and tax expenditures, see Sugin, supra 
note 69. In that article, I argued that it would be a bad idea to constitutionalize tax 
expenditure analysis. At that time, I did not imagine the Court would go significantly 
further and protect tax expenditures from constitutional review. 
 149 ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1462 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 150 Id. at 1450. 
 151 Id. at 1448-49 (majority opinion); id. at 1457 n.7 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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government support because declining to tax implies an 
absence of policy.  
Characterizing the STO credit as a tax cut makes the 
distinction between tax cuts and government spending purely 
formal, with potentially bizarre legal consequences. For 
example, the Court’s analysis would mean that a provision 
modeled after the U.K.’s system of charitable subsidies would be 
subject to a constitutional challenge because it comprises both 
extraction and spending by the government, while our current 
charitable deduction model would not be subject to review 
because it lacks those two elements. In the U.K., the 
government directs the tax subsidy for charitable contributions 
directly to the charities,152 rather than reducing the tax liability 
of the contributors by that amount, as is the case in the U.S. 
system.153 An important recent proposal to reform the charitable 
contribution in the United States, proposed by the influential 
Bipartisan Policy Center,154 would provide a matching grant 
system similar to the one in the U.K., which would distinguish 
it, as a legal matter, under the ACS court’s approach, from the 
deduction under current law. 
The legal analysis of tax expenditures becomes truncated 
on account of the ACS Court’s characterization of the state’s 
decision as one to not tax. Taken to its logical conclusion, the 
state would be free to decline to tax on any basis that it wants—
a tax credit for payments to racially discriminatory schools, 
contrary to the clear precedent of Bob Jones University v. 
United States,155 would be an acceptable decision not to tax. The 
Court’s reasoning could apply to tax credits more specifically 
drafted to benefit religion. For that matter, a tax credit for 
Christians only would also be a decision not to tax, though it 
would clearly be precisely the kind of thing that the 
Establishment Clause should prohibit. In short, the Court’s 
decision to characterize a tax credit as the state declining to 
impose a tax proves too much. Not only does it shelter 
Arizona’s STO credit from review, but it potentially protects 
  
 152 See Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, 2003, c. 1, § 713 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/1/section/713. The British 
equivalent of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service explains the operation of its system on 
its website. Giving to Charity Through Gift Aid, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/individuals/giving/gift-aid.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
 153 See I.R.C. § 170 (2006). 
 154 BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., RESTORING AMERICA’S FUTURE 27 (2010) (describing 
the credits for charitable contributions as going directly to the charitable institutions). 
 155 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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any other provision in a tax statute that reduces ultimate tax 
liability, regardless of the provision’s design or effect. Since tax 
expenditures are characterized in the negative—as an absence 
of affirmative government action—it could now be impossible to 
get constitutional review of any tax expenditure. This is 
precisely the opposite of how courts should approach tax 
statutes; any provision of the tax law, whether it functions as 
integral to taxing or a substitute for spending, should have to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny on the merits.156  
It is also possible that the majority’s approach will 
extend beyond tax expenditures. Justice Thomas has been 
trying to reduce the scrutiny of both tax expenditures and 
direct spending for some time. In Rosenberger v. Virginia, 
instead of arguing for scrutiny of tax expenditures on the same 
terms as direct expenditures, as do the advocates of tax 
expenditure analysis, Justice Thomas instead argued against 
scrutiny for direct spending on account of the existence of 
equivalent tax expenditures.157 ACS may be the beginning of the 
slippery slope that leaves tax expenditures (now) and direct 
spending (later) largely unreviewable for constitutional 
violations. These are reasons to worry about the Roberts 
Court’s tax precedents. 
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACS DECISION 
A. The Court Encourages More Non-Revenue Policy in the 
Tax Law, When There Is Too Much Already  
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in NFIB and ACS is 
troubling from a policy perspective because it encourages 
legislatures to use the tax law to achieve non-revenue policy. 
When non-revenue policies make their way into the tax law, 
they are often revenue losers hidden from the political 
process—a significant problem given the current dire fiscal 
situation. Even revenue raisers are undesirable if they are hidden 
  
 156 See Sugin, supra note 69, at 418-24 (arguing that income-defining 
provisions should be subject to the same constitutional scrutiny as tax expenditures). 
In that article, I focused on the problem of insulating normal structural provisions of 
the tax law from constitutional scrutiny. What the ACS Court has now done is far more 
radical than that; it has now insulated any provision of the tax law from challenge on 
Establishment Clause grounds simply because it is a provision of the tax law. Both 
structural provisions and tax expenditures would be unchallengeable under the 
majority’s interpretation.  
 157 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-55 
(1995); see also discussion in Sugin, supra note 69, at 463. 
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in the tax law as a way to bypass legitimate restraints in the 
political process. Non-revenue policies in the tax law, whether 
they happen to gain or lose revenue, directly burden revenue 
collection by diverting administrative resources, thereby harming 
the effectiveness of governmental administration.  
The practice of loading up the tax law with non-revenue 
policy is already at a critical point. The Internal Revenue Code 
is bloated with all sorts of policies that tax administrators are 
not specialized in interpreting or accustomed to carrying out. 
In addition to raising revenue, the Code is now burdened with 
health care policy,158 housing policy,159 family policy,160 and 
education policy,161 among others. Only a few of these disparate 
policies have synergies with revenue collection. The 
proliferation of these policies in the tax law has distorted the 
political process, concentrating power in the tax-writing 
committees.162 It has allowed politicians to pretend that they 
are reducing the size of the government while actually 
increasing it. These policies burden the IRS with an obligation 
to enforce provisions that its expertise in revenue collection 
fails to prepare it for.163 Some non-revenue provisions are 
justifiable because they are related to the functions carried out 
by the tax law and are more efficiently administered through 
the current tax law’s existing apparatus,164 but many provisions 
  
 158 The exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is the single most 
expensive tax expenditure in the budget, estimated at over $180 billion for fiscal 2013. 
See ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2013, supra note 23, at 261 tbl.17-3. 
 159 The home mortgage interest deduction is the second largest item on 
Treasury’s list, at approximately $101 billion. See id. But the home mortgage interest 
deduction, I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2006), is only one of numerous provisions related to 
housing. Homeowners may also exclude the gain on their home sales, id. § 121, and 
deduct their property taxes, id. § 64. Developers can depreciate residential housing 
more quickly than other buildings. Id. § 168(c). 
 160 In addition to the child credit and dependency deduction, id. §§ 24, 151, 
there are credits for the costs of adoption, id. § 23, and child care, id. § 21. 
 161 There are credits for education expenses, id. § 25A, a deduction for interest 
on education loans, id. § 221, an exclusion for employer financed education expenses, 
id. § 127, and tax-preferred savings vehicles for education expenses, id. §§ 529, 530. 
 162 See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax 
Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2010). 
 163 The Affordable Care Act is a tremendous burden on the IRS, requiring 
additional funding. See Written Testimony of Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, Before the H. Appropriations Comm. Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t on FY 
2013 Budget, Mar. 21, 2012, at 9, 11, available at http://appropriations.house.gov/ 
uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap23-wstate-dhshulman-20120321.pdf. 
 164 The earned income tax credit is probably the best example. See David A. 
Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE 
L.J. 955, 961 (2004). 
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do not. We need to worry whether tax policy swallows up too 
much of the rest of the government. 
The ACS majority’s approach to tax expenditures 
conflicts with the methodology used by the other branches of 
government and is in conflict with the prevailing understanding 
in public debate and scholarly analysis. The Joint Committee on 
Taxation and the Treasury Department, the government’s 
taxation and budget experts, do not characterize tax 
expenditures as tax cuts, but treat them as functionally 
equivalent to spending.165 The mantra of tax reformers has been 
to simplify the tax law and repeal tax expenditures, not 
promote them.166 The most important recent proposal on 
reforming the whole tax system adopts as its basic framework a 
goal of broadening the base and lowering the rates.167 That 
means repealing tax expenditures, not expanding them. 
There are good reasons why reformers generally want to 
reduce the number and cost of tax expenditures. They increase 
the complexity of the tax law, and are often inefficient or 
inequitable.168 Some provide benefits only to the highest-income 
taxpayers.169 Some are shameless giveaways to special interests.170 
Some provide incentives to engage in activities that are not in the 
country’s long-term interest.171 That said, I am critical of the 
wholesale attack on tax expenditures in the recent reform 
proposals and I have argued that distributional concerns 
  
 165 The Office of Management and Budget states that tax expenditures are 
“alternatives to other policy instruments, such as spending.” ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 2013, supra note 23, at 247. 
 166 In his recent proposal on corporate tax reform, President Obama recommended 
repealing targeted provisions available to corporations that reduce their taxable income. In 
connection with that base broadening, he proposed reducing the highest marginal corporate 
rate. See WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR 
BUSINESS TAX REFORM (Feb. 2012), [hereinafter JOINT REPORT], available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-
for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf. 
 167 NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF 
TRUTH 29 (2010) (often known as the Bowles-Simpson Report) [hereinafter MOMENT OF 
TRUTH]; see also BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., RESTORING AMERICA’S FUTURE 30 (2010). 
 168 This was the reason why Stanley Surrey believed it was important to 
identify tax expenditures and give them a name, as he did. See STANLEY S. SURREY, 
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 136 (1973). 
 169 See Leonard E. Burman, Christopher Geissler & Eric J. Toder, How Big 
Are Total Individual Income Tax Expenditures, and Who Benefits from Them?, 98 AM. 
ECON. REV. 79, 82 (2008). In 2007, the preferential rates on capital gains and dividends 
were enjoyed by the “top 1 percent of taxpayers and provide[d] little income gain for 
anyone else.” Id. 
 170 See Sugin, supra note 57, at 41. 
 171 This is why President Obama has suggested eliminating the tax preference 
for fossil fuels. See JOINT REPORT, supra note 166, at 9. 
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demand a more nuanced approach to tax expenditure reform.172 
Nevertheless, there is no question that tax expenditures need 
to be reviewed as part of comprehensive reform.  
The debate about tax reform taking place in 
government, in the media, and in academia, reflects a uniform 
acceptance of tax expenditure analysis and its core principle 
that tax expenditures are equivalent to government spending 
and need to be evaluated on those terms. The Supreme Court’s 
insistence that tax expenditures are not the same as spending 
is therefore at odds with the framework shared by virtually 
everyone else who has thought about the issue. The ACS 
decision sends the judiciary in a unique direction by equating 
tax expenditures with rate reductions.173 Treating tax 
expenditures as tax cuts encourages irresponsible budgeting 
and disenfranchises low-income taxpayers who are unable to 
benefit from the tax credits. While the high Court is purposely 
insulated from the political process, its position on tax 
expenditures makes it appear that the justices are completely 
clueless about the necessary direction our fiscal policies need to 
take. 
B. ACS Encourages Legislatures and Courts to Treat Tax 
Expenditures as Costless 
The Court’s ACS opinion also encourages increased 
policymaking in the tax law by offering the dubious economic 
argument that reducing taxes does not reduce revenue and by 
suggesting that nobody needs to bear the burden of taxation. It 
was not necessary for the Court to discuss this issue when 
reaching its holding, and it is troubling that it did, because the 
opinion encourages legislatures to treat tax expenditures as 
though they are free, even though they are not. Recognizing 
and identifying what parties bear the burden of taxes, even if 
they are in future generations, is important to responsible 
public budgeting. Similar to treating tax expenditures as tax 
cuts, this aspect of the ACS decision makes tax expenditures 
disappear from the legal regime, creating another conflict 
between legal and economic analyses. 
  
 172 See Sugin, supra note 57, at 6, 40-42. 
 173 This aligns the Court with the tax expenditure fringe occupied by Grover 
Norquist, who is on a quest to starve the government of revenue by any means possible 
so that it can be “drowned in a bathtub.” Paul Krugman, The Tax-Cut Con, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 14, 2003 (Magazine), at 57. 
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A closer look at the ACS opinion is helpful to 
understand the analysis. The first part of the opinion explained 
why taxpayers, generally, lack standing to challenge 
government actions they do not like.174 Frothingham v. Mellon,175 
which established the doctrine against taxpayer standing, 
described a taxpayer’s injury—qua taxpayer—as too “remote, 
fluctuating and uncertain” and shared by everyone, so that no 
case or controversy was presented for judicial review. Instead, 
taxpayer complaints about government spending presented an 
issue to be resolved in the political process. Frothingham 
contained the reasonable observation that each government 
spending decision is financed by miniscule exactions from 
individuals, none of which—standing alone—is significant 
enough to support standing.  
The ACS opinion took the Frothingham idea—that no 
taxpayer suffers when the state expends funds—a step further, 
by rejecting the notion that there is any cost at all to taxpayers 
when the state spends resources. The burden on taxpayers is 
not just miniscule—as it was under the Frothingham 
analysis—it totally disappears. The ACS Court came to this 
conclusion by explaining that the government’s budget does not 
necessarily suffer when it “expends resources or declines to 
impose a tax”176 because (1) reduced taxation raises revenue, 
and (2) increased government spending reduces government 
costs. While both these inferences are possible, neither is 
likely.177 The Court’s legal conclusion on the injury question was 
thus dependent on dubious economic assumptions. 
Reducing taxation can only raise revenue if there is 
enough economic growth to produce sufficient additional 
revenue to cover the loss from the reduction. Unfortunately, 
there is little evidence that tax cuts will work that way, at least 
at the levels of taxation that have actually been in effect. As 
the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts have shown, cutting taxes reduces 
  
 174 There was no dispute on this issue; it has been settled for decades that 
there is no all-purpose taxpayer standing because taxpayers generally have insufficient 
injury to challenge government actions. The Court could have proceeded straight to an 
analysis of Flast’s exception, which grants taxpayers standing despite their lack of 
particularized injury. Instead, the Court used the opportunity to create a novel 
framework for analyzing public economics. ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1444 (2011). 
 175 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 176 ACS, 131 S. Ct. at 1437. 
 177 For a succinct review of the literature on reducing rates to maximize 
revenue, see Bruce Bartlett, What is the Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate?, TAX NOTES, 
Feb. 20, 2012, at 1013. 
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revenue,178 and raising taxes increases revenue.179 The revenue-
from-growth argument is one that can only apply to business 
credits, not to personal credits like the one in ACS, because the 
tax reduction must translate into economic growth that 
produces more taxable income for the math to work. The ACS 
majority cited an earlier ruling it had made on business tax 
credits to support that statement, even though the cited case 
does not clearly take that economic position adopted in the 
later decision.180 It is surprising that the Supreme Court chose 
to take a contested position on the economic effects of tax 
credits at all since there was no argument in ACS that the STO 
credits produced revenue that paid for the cost of those credits.  
Instead, the Court maintained that the plaintiffs could 
suffer no injury because STOs support private school 
education, and that private school education reduces public 
costs because it relieves the government of the burden of 
educating the children who could have attended public 
schools.181 Reducing the burdens of government is a common 
justification for tax benefits for nonprofit organizations, and 
may even be an argument for treating tax benefits for such 
institutions as part of a normative tax structure. And it is 
possible that the STO credit saves Arizona money.182 But that 
  
 178 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CHANGES IN CBO’S BASELINE PROJECTIONS SINCE 
JANUARY 2001 (June 7, 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
attachments/06-07-ChangesSince2001Baseline.pdf. 
 179 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS OF OBRA-93 (1994), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4832/doc03.pdf.; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND 
BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 32 (1997), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/attachments/Eb09-97.pdf. 
 180 See ACS, 131 S. Ct. at 1443-44 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 
U.S. 332, 334 (2006) (denying standing in business context)). 
 181 Id. at 1444. 
 182 If the state legislature designed this credit as a way to reduce the state’s 
burden in providing public school education, it would have had alternative programs, 
some of which could have been tax-based, that might have been more effective. Tax-based 
incentives are generally designed to encourage taxpayers to spend some of their own 
money on something, so the 100 percent credit seems unusually generous. Some of the 
alternative programs that the state could have adopted to support private school 
education would not have been eligible for the tax benefits allowed under the STO credit, 
so the credit may have been designed to avoid the problems inherent in other designs. For 
example, a credit to the parents of private school students has encountered constitutional 
difficulty where parents claimed tax benefits for religious education.  
Special tax benefits, however, cannot be squared with the principle of 
neutrality established by the decisions of this Court. To the contrary, insofar 
as such benefits render assistance to parents who send their children to 
sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance 
those religious institutions.  
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conclusion can only be proven with empirical evidence that 
shows that the savings on education exceeds the cost of the 
credit, and that there is a causal connection between the tax 
credit and attendance at private schools.183  
The Court’s economic conclusions—that reducing taxes 
raises revenue and that increasing spending reduces costs—are 
important beyond the taxpayer standing question. If we take 
these conclusions seriously, they should also apply to 
individuals challenging tax credits who would have personal 
injury standing. For example, parents whose children were 
unable to receive STO scholarships because they do not 
practice the specified religion might suffer no injury under this 
analysis because the state incurs greater cost for educating 
their children in public school. The Court’s approach to such a 
tax benefit undermines the injury argument itself, further 
insulating these provisions from legal attack.  
Another aspect of the Court’s discussion that tax credits 
are free is worth considering. The Court suggested that the 
plaintiffs may have no injury because if there were no tax 
credits, the government might have collected the money and 
used it for something else.184 If the government had spent the 
money on something not currently funded at all, the taxpayer 
would be in the same position as with the credit in place. While 
it is true that government can choose to spend on something 
  
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973). But see 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1983) (upholding tax benefit). It is not clear 
whether the STO credit was designed to benefit donors, student families, or taxpayers 
generally, or what its effect has been, so the Court’s position on the burdens of 
government is pure speculation. 
 183 The ACS Court assumed that the scholarship assistance provided through 
the STO program encouraged families to send their children to private schools when 
they otherwise would have relied on public education. But there is no evidence in the 
record that the scholarships actually incentivized families to send their children to 
private school. If those children would have attended private schools even if there had 
been no scholarships subsidized by the tax credit, then the scholarships are simply 
windfalls to the families of recipients. Similarly, if donors would have financed 
scholarships for needy families without any tax incentive, the credits are windfalls to 
the donors who receive them. In neither windfall case does the tax credit operate to 
reduce the burden of government because in both scenarios, the demand for private 
school would be unaffected by the credit. The ACS Court also assumed that the 
existence of private schools reduces government cost of public schools, another 
empirical question. Whether Arizona’s private schools reduce the cost of public 
education depends on the concentration of private schools and the overhead costs 
compared to the marginal costs of public education. Holding all else constant, in order 
to determine whether total taxes would go up or down without the STO tax credit 
provision, it would be necessary to know how the credit affects the decisions of both 
donors and parents of scholarship students, and how the existence of private schools 
affects the funding of public schools. 
 184 ACS, 131 S. Ct. at 1444. 
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other than what it currently chooses to spend on, that choice is 
not irrelevant to individual taxpayers, and it is troubling that 
the Court’s treatment made so little of it. Arizona’s choice to 
direct funds to STOs means that tax revenues are not being 
collected that could be collected and used for something that 
would have benefited the taxpayer-plaintiffs more than the 
STO program. It is a mistake to assume that taxpayers should 
not care how revenues are used as long as their personal tax 
liability does not change. Debates about taxation too often 
ignore the spending side of the budget, and this argument 
reflects that myopia. The costs and benefits of government to 
any individual depend on both that individual’s tax liability 
and that individual’s share of government benefits, in whatever 
form they take. Equal tax liabilities do not imply equal overall 
packages of government burdens and benefits. 
Targeted tax benefits, as a whole, represent a 
significant allocation of government resources. The Court’s 
approach—treating each particular tax expenditure as 
costless—has produced a federal budget where spending on tax 
expenditures exceeds revenue collected.185 Most tax 
expenditures are small, and therefore, insignificant as a 
budgetary matter taken alone, but they add up on the federal 
level to over a trillion dollars a year.186 It is not conducive to good 
federal policy to treat tax expenditures as free, and there would 
certainly be increased revenue if we repealed all tax expenditures, 
which is precisely why tax reform today is about repealing tax 
expenditures.187 Thinking that tax expenditures are tax reductions 
for particular individuals rather than government spending 
financed by all, disassociates taxes from the burdens on 
individuals. While no identifiable taxpayer is substantially injured 
by a single tax expenditure, the totality of tax expenditures 
threatens the country’s fiscal viability. The Court’s assertion of a 
no-cost perspective makes tax reform that much harder. 
  
 185 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, FISCAL YEAR 
2012, at 167 tbl.8.7, 346 tbl.15.4 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/hist.pdf. 
 186 HUNGERFORD, supra note 71, at 13. 
 187 The Fiscal Commission’s starting point is a repeal of all tax expenditures. 
It builds on that idea by adding back some provisions and raising rates to finance 
them. See MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra note 167, at 29. 
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C. Muddling Tax Credits with Tax Cuts Undermines the 
Coherence of the Tax Law  
The tax expenditure budget was designed to provide 
conceptual clarity in the tax law.188 It categorizes some 
statutory provisions as part of the structure of the tax, and 
others as extraneous to that structure.189 Unlike elements in the 
tax law that are necessary to accurately measure income, like 
deductions for business expenses, if all tax expenditures were 
repealed, the tax law could still effectively carry out its revenue 
collection function. Without tax expenditures, however, tax law 
could no longer incentivize and subsidize particular activities, a 
concededly important function of the federal tax system. While 
the federal income tax is a far cry from an ideal income tax, 
there are general rules in the tax law that make the system 
operate in a moderately consistent way.190 The ACS majority 
confuses the analysis of taxation by failing to recognize that 
there is a principled distinction between reducing taxes, on the 
one hand, and spending in the tax law, on the other. Tax cuts 
are about reducing burdens on individuals while spending is 
about targeting government resources for particular purposes. 
Conflating tax expenditures with tax cuts threatens the 
logic of the tax system because it incorrectly equates provisions 
necessary for accurately measuring the tax base with 
provisions that depart from base measurement. While there is 
not complete agreement on which items constitute tax 
expenditures, there is broad acceptance that most of the items 
that are treated as tax expenditures do share a spending 
character.191 The reasonable disagreements about compiling the 
list of tax expenditures largely reflect differences about 
whether the underlying baseline should reflect income or 
consumption tax principles.192  
The hard issues in defining what constitutes a tax 
expenditure are not raised by the tax credit in the ACS case.193 
  
 188 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 62, at 26. 
 189 See ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 61, at 5. 
 190 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF 
TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 1, 10 (Joint Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter 
RECONSIDERATION REPORT].  
 191 The Joint Committee and the Treasury have very few differences in their 
compilations. 
 192 See Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 
57 TAX L. REV. 187, 189 (2004). 
 193 The Joint Committee on Taxation, in its comprehensive review of tax 
expenditures, created a new category that it called “Tax-Induced Structural 
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Credits are applied against tax, not against gross income, so 
they do not contribute to the determination of the tax base. For 
this reason, there is greater resemblance between tax credits 
and direct expenditures than there is between deductions—
which also reduce ultimate tax liability—and direct expenditures. 
Not all deductions are the equivalent of government spending 
because some deductions are necessary to accurately measure 
the income on which the tentative tax liability is based. The tax 
determination itself requires some addition and subtraction to 
determine the thing to be taxed.  
Deductions cannot be as easily translated into direct 
spending as credits because their value is a function of the 
taxpayer’s marginal rate—deductions operate to eliminate the 
tax on the deducted expenditure. This is why the costs of 
producing income should be deductions rather than credits. A 
credit operates to eliminate the cost of the credited amount, so 
a credit has an easily determined alternative program that 
spends government funds directly. A credit at 100 percent of 
the taxpayer’s expense, such as the STO credit, is 
indistinguishable from a direct government payment of the full 
amount of the taxpayer’s expense.194 This does not mean that 
every credit is independent of the normative features of a tax, 
just that it is more likely to be a substitute for spending 
because it is a better mechanism for designing subsidies.195  
Even proponents of tax expenditure analysis would 
concede that some reductions in tax liability should be 
considered tax cuts, while others should be treated as the 
equivalent of direct spending and analyzed on those terms. Tax 
cuts reduce burdens on taxpayers and shift resources from 
  
Distortions,” consisting of rules of the Code that “materially affect economic decisions 
in a manner that imposes substantial economic efficiency costs” such as the distinction 
between debt and equity. RECONSIDERATION REPORT, supra note 190, at 10; see also 
Sugin, supra note 57, at 41 (categorizing some provisions as “modifications to the base 
that reflect reasonable differences about the ideal baseline, such as provisions that 
make the system more consumption-tax like and less income-tax like”); DONALD 
MARRON & ERIC TODER, URB. INST. & URB.-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., MEASURING 
LEVIATHAN: HOW BIG IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? 7-8 (Mar. 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412528-How-Big-Is-The-Federal-Government.pdf 
(suggesting that tax expenditures could be treated as spending if they fit into the 
following categories: 1. Clear spending substitutes; 2. Targeted incentives to reallocate 
resources; 3. Substitutes for transfer programs; and 4. Departures from both 
consumption and income base). 
 194 This is an unusual characteristic because most credits are for some 
percentage of outlay. 
 195 Some credits may be an integral part of the rate structure rather than the 
definition of the tax base. See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1186-88 (1988). 
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control of the public sector to control by the private sector. 
There are three factors that help to illuminate whether a 
reduction in tax liability is actually a tax cut. First, burdens 
are about adjusting the tax on people, not things. If reductions 
are connected to favored activities or investments, they are not 
about adjusting the tax burden; tax cuts need to resemble rate 
reductions in some way. Second, the more targeted a provision, 
the more it resembles spending and the less it relates to 
burdens. And third, tax cuts reduce the size of government, 
while spending in the tax law increases it. Even though the 
ACS provision fails to resemble a real tax cut under these 
factors, the Court treats it as a tax cut nonetheless. 
The paradigm tax cut is a rate reduction; nobody would 
argue that reducing statutory rates should be treated as 
spending. That is because a reduction in rates reduces the 
burden of taxation without changing the definition of what is 
taxed.196 Rate reductions do not change the relative advantage 
of different sources or uses of funds. They do not encourage 
particular activities, but instead distribute tax burdens across 
broad groups of people. Targeted tax benefits do the opposite. 
They alter the advantage of particular sources or uses of funds, 
encourage particular activities, and change the burdens within 
income groups. Like rate reductions, repeal of a whole tax 
system, such as a state sales tax or the federal estate tax, also 
constitutes a tax cut. In those cases, the burden of taxation is 
eliminated without altering any underlying measure on which 
the tax depends. 
The ACS majority described the credit as declining to 
impose a tax.197 Declining to impose a tax should mean that the 
government has imposed no part of a tax. A targeted tax break 
within a tax system in place is very different from the absence 
of a tax. For example, the federal government has declined to 
impose a value added tax. Declining to impose that tax means 
that there is no part of a value-added tax in place. Once the 
general tax is chosen, excised elements of that tax do not 
operate in the same way as declining to impose the general tax 
in the first place. It is possible that some adjustments are tax 
cuts, but the more specific and targeted an adjustment, the less 
it looks like declining to impose a tax. Targeted tax provisions 
  
 196 See id. 
 197 ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011). 
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affect the relative economic advantage of different decisions 
within the general scheme in place.  
The Supreme Court’s approach in ACS fails to recognize 
that the coherence of the tax law requires certain provisions to 
be treated as part of the general rules that constitute the tax 
structure and others as extraneous. Calling the credit a tax cut 
muddles the structural components of the law with the non-
structural ones, undermining the integrity of coherent tax 
systems. The Joint Committee on Taxation’s recent study on 
tax expenditures198 is instructive on this point, and is an 
important affirmation of the tax law’s internal coherence. After 
many years of wrangling about the baseline against which to 
measure tax expenditures, the Joint Committee suggested that 
tax expenditures be redefined as provisions that are 
inconsistent with general rules that are evident in the 
structure of the tax in place.199 Under the revised approach, 
most tax expenditures defined under the old baseline rules 
continued to be included as tax expenditures.200  
The existence of a coherent tax in place—with whatever 
elements the legislature has chosen—refutes the Court’s 
contention that tax expenditure analysis treats all income as 
belonging to the government. The ACS majority stated: 
“Respondents’ . . . position assumes that income should be 
treated as if it were government property even if it has not 
come into the tax collector’s hands.”201 This is a variation on a 
well-worn mantra. In 1983, President Reagan’s Treasury 
Department asked: “If revenues . . . not collected due to ‘special’ 
tax provisions represent Government ‘expenditures,’ why not 
consider all tax rates below 100% ‘special,’ in which case all 
resources are effectively Government-controlled?”202 Both the 
Supreme Court’s statement and the Treasury’s question imply 
that there is no principled way to distinguish tax cuts from 
government spending. The Supreme Court, however, confused 
the government’s entitlement to presumptive tax payments 
with its much weaker claim on income more generally.203 The 
  
 198 See RECONSIDERATION REPORT, supra note 190. 
 199 Id. at 1, 16. 
 200 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF 
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008–2012 (Joint Comm. Print 2008) 
(containing tax expenditure budget prepared under the Reconsideration Report approach). 
 201 ACS, 131 S. Ct. at 1448 (emphasis added). 
 202 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, THE BUDGET OF 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1983, at 3 (1982).  
 203 Where there is a tax in place, the presumptive tax under that system is the 
baseline against which tax expenditures are measured. If the base is all consumer 
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tax law delineates what is properly treated as presumptive 
government property even before it comes into the tax 
collector’s hands, based on a combination of the base and the 
rates, and it is substantially less than what the law treats as 
the private property of individuals.  
In treating tax expenditures as undifferentiated tax 
cuts, the ACS majority adopted Grover Norquist’s incoherent 
approach to the tax system. Norquist has been one of the most 
controversial figures in tax policy for the last thirty years. His 
organization, Americans for Tax Reform, is responsible for the 
“Taxpayer Protection Pledge” that has been signed by 238 
members of the House of Representatives and 41 members of 
the Senate.204 It reads as follows: 
I, _______________, pledge . . . to the American people that I will: 
ONE, oppose any and all efforts to increase the marginal income tax 
rates for individuals and/or businesses; and TWO, oppose any net 
reduction or elimination of deductions and credits, unless matched 
dollar for dollar by further reducing tax rates.205  
The pledge’s wording makes clear that the drafters 
equate tax deductions and credits with reductions in tax 
liability that result from reduced rates. That is why the pledge 
treats increases in marginal tax rates and repeal of deductions 
and credits as equivalent sins. The goal of the pledge is to 
prevent any overall increase in tax revenue for the government, 
which explains the dollar for dollar match in reducing rates 
that is required when repealing deductions and credits.  
There is no tax equity norm underlying the pledge; it 
does not prevent an individual from suffering an increase in 
tax, as long as someone else enjoys a tax cut in the same 
amount. Thus, the pledge reflects only a desire to “starve the 
beast.” Starve the beast is a dubious theory of political economy 
that posits that tax cuts will force the government to grow 
  
purchases, it would be irrelevant that the tax excluded investment income. But if the 
base is all consumer purchases, with the exclusion of gasoline, that exclusion is 
relevant because it is a narrow exception carved out from a presumptive baseline that 
would include it. The possible universe of government spending through the tax law is 
limited by the definition of the tax base and the rates applicable in the system in place. 
So, if the base is consumer purchases, which total $100,000 and the rate is three 
percent, the presumptive tax is $3000, not $100,000. The decision to exempt gasoline 
would represent a $300 decision if gasoline purchases are $10,000. 
 204 Federal Taxpayer Protection Pledge Questions and Answers, AM. FOR TAX 
REFORM, http://www.atr.org/federal-taxpayer-protection-questions-answers-a6204 (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
 205 Taxpayer Protection Pledge, AM. FOR TAX REFORM, http://www.atr.org/ 
userfiles/Senate%20Pledge(2).pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
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smaller.206 Bruce Bartlett, a Treasury official in the Reagan 
administration, has claimed that “to a large extent our current 
budgetary problems stem from the widespread adoption” of the 
starve the beast theory.207 While an overwhelming number of 
Republican politicians have signed the pledge, including both 
Presidents Bush,208 the “beast” has continued to grow. 
Substantial reductions in tax revenue have been accompanied 
by deficit spending instead of spending reductions, creating 
enormous long-term fiscal imbalance. The Congressional 
Budget Office estimated that federal debt would soon “reach 
roughly 70 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)—the 
highest percentage since shortly after World War II.”209 Last 
year, the budget deficit was 8.7 percent of GDP, the highest 
level in decades.210 
Contrary to the implications of the pledge, there is 
widespread agreement among experts that marginal rate cuts 
are not equivalent to deductions and credits. The acceptance of 
tax expenditure analysis is widespread, even among 
conservative economists, who reject the equivalence of rate cuts 
with all deductions and credits. Martin Feldstein, one of the 
country’s most distinguished economists,211 has proposed 
“limiting each individual’s tax reduction from the use of tax 
expenditures to 5% of that individual’s adjusted gross income.”212 
He defines tax expenditures for purposes of his proposal as 
“special tax rules that substitute for direct government 
spending as a way to subsidize health insurance, mortgage 
borrowing and other things.”213 Similarly, Gregory Mankiw214 
  
 206 See Editorial, Budget Calculations Slay the “Starve the Beast” Mythology: 
View, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-20/budget-
calculations-slay-the-starve-the-beast-mythology-view.html. 
 207 Bruce Bartlett, Tax Cuts and “Starving The Beast,” FORBES (May 7, 2010, 6:00 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/06/tax-cuts-republicans-starve-the-beast-columnists-
bruce-bartlett_print.html. 
 208 See Federal Taxpayer Protection Pledge Questions and Answers, supra note 
204; AM. FOR TAX REFORM, FEDERAL TAXPAYER PROTECTION PLEDGE, 113TH 
CONGRESSIONAL LIST, available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/atrfiles/files/files/121012-
113thCongress.pdf; Taxpayer Protection Pledge, supra note 205. 
 209 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S 2011 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (June 
2011), available at http://cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=12212. 
 210 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TESTIMONY ON THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022 (Feb. 2, 2012), available at http://cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/127xx/doc12713/02-02-TestimonyOutlook-Senate.pdf.  
 211 Chairman of the Council of Econ. Advisers under President Ronald Reagan, 
professor at Harvard, and a member of The Wall Street Journal’s board of contributors. 
 212 Martin Feldstein, The Tax Reform Evidence from 1986, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204002304576629481571778262.html? 
KEYWORDS=feldstein. 
 213 Id. 
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has embraced the idea that targeted tax cuts increase the size 
of government.215 He has argued that “tax expenditures are best 
viewed as a hidden form of spending.”216 Even the conservative 
think tank Cato Institute has warmed to the notion that tax 
expenditures differ from tax cuts.217  
The final factor that helps to distinguish tax cuts and 
government spending through the tax law is their effects on the 
size of government. Spending increases the size of government, 
while tax cuts reduce it. Rate reductions diminish the total 
resources under government control, while many tax expenditures 
increase the reach of the government’s economic control. Targeted 
tax breaks reflect substantial government involvement in the 
economy, in the same way as direct spending. The economist David 
Bradford invented an often-cited hypothetical “weapons supply tax 
credit” that would replace all defense spending with transferrable 
tax credits for the manufacture of weapons.218 Although the direct 
appropriations of the government would go down as the defense 
budget is transformed into a tax credit, the size of government 
would not shrink, since it would still control the manufacture of 
weapons. Public resources would still be committed by the 
government and would still be received by the weapons 
manufacturers. The credit would not free up any resources for 
private control the way a real tax cut would. The same is true for 
the tax credit in ACS; it represents an intrusion into the market for 
education, and reflects government control of resources directed to 
private school tuition.  
This is not to suggest that it is easy or clear where lines 
should be drawn. Many reductions in tax liability are not easily 
categorized as either rate reductions or spending because they 
affect different taxpayers differently. A provision that reduces 
tax for some taxpayers, but not all, might be a tax cut or it 
  
 214 Chairman of the Council of Econ. Advisers under President George W. 
Bush and a professor at Harvard. 
 215 N. Gregory Mankiw, The Blur Between Spending and Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 20, 2010, at BU5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/business/ 
economy/21view.html. 
 216 Id. 
 217 It published an article by a former chief of staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation entitled The Hidden Hand of Government Spending that argued that tax 
expenditures distort the budget and political process. Edward D. Kleinbard, The 
Hidden Hand of Government Spending, REGULATION, Fall 2010, at 18, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv33n3/regv33n3-2.pdf. 
 218 See David F. Bradford, Reforming Budgetary Language, in PUBLIC 
FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE NEW CENTURY 98 (Sijbren Cnossen & Hans-
Werner Sinn eds., 2003) (proposing the hypothetical credit); see also Shaviro, supra 
note 192, at 197 (explaining how such a credit increases the size of government). 
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might be the equivalent of spending, depending on the purpose 
and design of the provision. For example, the earned income 
tax credit,219 which provides a refundable credit to low-income 
taxpayers who earn wages, can be understood either as a tax 
cut or spending. If it is understood to reduce the burden of 
payroll taxation on low-income workers, then it is like an 
adjustment to the rates, making it a tax cut. It creates a 
negative rate of tax for poor workers, which is integral to the 
rate system. On the other hand, it might be understood as a 
transfer payment to recipients, in place of a federal welfare 
program that sends out checks.220  
The minimum lesson to draw from the instability of 
these categories is that constitutional consequences should not 
depend on them. All tax-law provisions, whether structural or 
not, should be subject to the limitations of the Bill of Rights. In 
a previous article, I warned against constitutionalizing the 
definition of a tax expenditure.221 Unfortunately, ACS has done 
just that. Its key determination is on a constitutional question: 
whether there is a case or controversy for purposes of Article 
III.222 The majority’s holding turned on whether the challenged 
provision is designed as direct spending or a tax expenditure. 
The form of a tax expenditure has now been elevated to 
constitutional importance. Tax “cuts” and increased “spending” 
through the tax law can be the same thing, with different 
political spin.223 So it is hard to accept that one is subject to a 
different legal regime than the other. But that seems to be 
where the Supreme Court has taken tax expenditures. The 
highly formal requirements of extraction and spending that it 
read into the Flast standard means that equivalent policies 
carried out in slightly different ways but reaching precisely the 
same result have different constitutional consequences. The 
constitutional issues are equivalent, but they are now subject 
to different treatment in court. The Supreme Court seems to 
have mistaken political rhetoric for legal description. 
  
 219 I.R.C. § 32 (2006). 
 220 The welfare characterization would be more compelling if the poorest 
individuals received the biggest credits. But they do not, so the Earned Income Tax 
Credit seems to be an adjustment to the tax system, more like a tax cut. 
 221 See generally Sugin, supra note 69. 
 222 ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1444 (2011). 
 223 I have previously argued this at length. See Sugin, supra note 69, at 424-26. 
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D. Privileging Tax Expenditures Favors High-Income 
Taxpayers, Encourages Irresponsible State Budgeting, 
and Creates a Bias for Reducing the Tax Base 
In addition to the consequences already discussed, the 
protected legal status of tax expenditures pursuant to the ACS 
opinion could produce further undesirable results. This section 
mentions a few, but it is likely there will be additional 
unanticipated consequences of the Court’s reconceptualization 
of tax expenditures because its approach fundamentally alters 
the legal approach to many tax law provisions. 
One possible consequence is that legislatures may shun 
refundable tax credits, in favor of nonrefundable ones, to the 
detriment of low-income individuals. The distributional fairness 
of the federal tax system depends on refundable credits because 
they are the mechanism for providing equal benefits to high and 
low-income taxpayers. The ACS Court did not discuss the 
treatment of refundable credits, which were not before it 
because the Arizona credit is not refundable. Refundable 
credits are those that are paid to individuals regardless of their 
tax liability, such as the earned income tax credit, while 
nonrefundable credits depend on offsetting tax owed to the 
government. A taxpayer with $100 tax liability and a $300 
refundable credit would receive a $200 check from the 
government, while a taxpayer with a nonrefundable credit 
would reduce tax liability to zero but not below.  
Refundable credits challenge the analytical structure 
that the ACS Court created because it is hard to characterize 
refundable credits as tax cuts when there is no tax liability to 
offset.224 Perhaps the $100 reduction in the taxpayer’s bill 
qualifies as a tax cut, but the additional $200 check sent by the 
government is not. Under the ACS Court’s framework, the 
refunded $200 would have to be characterized as extracted 
from other taxpayers and spent as a transfer payment. In that 
analysis, refundable credits—at least the refundable portion of 
them—would be constitutionally distinguishable from 
nonrefundable credits. A constitutional distinction dependent 
upon refundability, or the extent refunded, seems highly 
unprincipled because the nonrefundable portion has the same 
subsidy character as the refundable part. Such a distinction 
  
 224 The Earned Income Tax Credit is refundable, but it may be a reduction in 
payroll taxes paid, so would not necessarily present the problem of excess refundability 
the text raises. I.R.C. § 32. 
830   BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:3 
encourages states and localities to adopt only nonrefundable 
credits, which would deny them to individuals who are most in 
need of government financial subsidies for their expenditures, 
since, by definition, they have little income. 
Because tax expenditures will be subject to less judicial 
review than government spending, legislatures may try to 
substitute tax credits for direct appropriations, reducing 
legislative accountability and budget control. Taxpayers are 
largely in control of the budgetary impact of tax expenditures 
because they operate as entitlements. Tax credits transfer 
government resources in an amount determined by taxpayers, 
without coordination among themselves or knowledge of the 
cumulative cost. The amount may be limited per taxpayer, but 
not overall as a budget item. Arizona’s reports on the STO 
credit program indicate that the sum of money flowing to 
STOs, and the overall public cost of the credit, has increased 
over time.225 Proliferation of this type of tax credit would be 
unfortunate because it constitutes an abdication of legislative 
responsibility and control.  
Budgeting is hard political work and legislatures need 
to make difficult trade-offs. Many states have constitutionally 
imposed requirements to balance their budgets.226 Individual 
taxpayers may not be aware of the complex interaction of 
different priorities or the costs that particular choices might 
impose on other public goals. A budgeting procedure that 
allows taxpayers to direct government funds, a few hundred 
dollars at a time, can undermine fiscal discipline overall, and 
skew the support available for a few programs. Credits can 
deplete the public treasury without legislators prioritizing 
funding choices, a core responsibility of representative 
government. The ACS decision encourages this kind of 
irresponsible legislative behavior by providing greater judicial 
cover for check-the-box budgeting. 
A possible defense of tax credits as part of the budgeting 
process is that they can be considered a form of direct 
  
 225 See ARIZ. DEP’T OF REV., PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION ORGANIZATION INCOME 
TAX CREDITS IN ARIZONA: A SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY FY2012, at 2, available at 
http://www.azdor.gov/Portals/0/Reports/FY2012%20private%20schl%20tuition%20org%
20crdt%20rept.pdf. 
 226 See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE BALANCED BUDGET 
REQUIREMENTS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/budget/state-balanced-budget-requirements.aspx (last updated Apr. 12, 1999). 
2013] THE GREAT AND MIGHTY TAX LAW 831 
 
democracy.227 The state of Arizona could be using the STO credit 
to determine which STOs the people want to fund and how 
much. That argument suggests that tax expenditures can be 
effectively used to promote civic engagement generally, even for 
programs that are not questionable under the Establishment 
Clause. Unfortunately, the Arizona credit is poorly designed for 
the “taxes as ballots” model.228 In order to accurately gauge the 
public’s commitment to particular programs, there must be some 
after-tax cost to voting with your checkbook. Because there is no 
after-tax cost to individuals who direct government funds to 
STOs, the signal of support for particular organizations is too 
weak to be meaningful. The paradigm for taxes as ballots is the 
federal charitable deduction, under which taxpayers must spend 
some of their own money to get the functional equivalent of a 
matching grant from the government.229 They can increase 
government subsidies, but they also need to “vote” with their 
own money.  
In addition, the taxes-as-ballot-model as applied to 
nonrefundable credits is troubling from a political perspective. 
Because the credit is nonrefundable, it effectively disenfranchises 
the poorest citizens from participating in the decision of what to 
fund. There is no compelling reason to exclude the poor from the 
political decision about which STOs deserve funding, but only 
taxpayers with sufficient resources are able to direct state 
resources to the STO of their choice. Individual matching costs 
might justify excluding the lowest income taxpayers, but in this 
case, there is no cost to individuals who have sufficient tax 
liability to absorb the credit. Consequently, low-income 
taxpayers may receive scholarships, but only if high-income 
taxpayers choose to direct state funding to STOs that will grant 
them scholarships.230 This illustrates a serious distributional 
concern because it involves the exercise of political power that is 
  
 227 See generally Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387 (1998) 
(suggesting that tax expenditures like the charitable deduction are a form of voting 
with your money because the taxpayer pays some amount and the government adds a 
subsidy to it). 
 228 This is Levmore’s term. I have been skeptical of taxes as ballots, generally. 
See Sugin, supra note 69, at 456 n.228. 
 229 See generally Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable 
Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377 (1972) 
(analyzing a direct government matching grant program to remedy shortcomings of the 
charitable deduction). 
 230 Since STOs can discriminate on the basis of a child’s religion, some low-
income individuals are ineligible for the bulk of STO money. See ACS, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 
1440-41 (2011). 
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allocated only to those who have sufficient income to owe tax. The 
preferences of the taxpayers, who make use of the credit, will 
determine the choices of the scholarship seekers, while low-income 
taxpayers are excluded from exercising that choice. A credit with 
this design fails to provide advantages for the political system. 
The ACS decision also presents a potential meta-
problem for revenue collection since the effect of the precedent 
may ultimately be contraction of the tax base. Shielding tax 
benefits from review by treating them as declining to tax would 
exacerbate a bias that already exists in the review of tax 
statutes, to the detriment of the government treasury. There is 
already an imbalance in the reviewability of tax statutes 
created by the standing rules applicable to most taxpayer 
suits.231 Government imposes tax through a system that 
includes revenue-raising and revenue-reducing provisions. The 
revenue-raising provisions are subject to perennial challenge.232 
The revenue-reducing provisions in the form of tax 
expenditures are targeted reductions that produce identifiable 
winners, but not identifiable losers. The general public, and the 
fisc that it funds, is always the loser from targeted tax benefits. 
Taxpayers complaining that they have been overtaxed are 
entitled to sue to reduce their assessed tax liability, and 
taxpayers attempting to reduce their liability will sometimes 
win and sometimes lose on the merits. The set of cases, as a 
whole, has a revenue-reducing effect because the government 
losses will reduce collections compared to the government’s 
initial position, and the government wins will leave the original 
assessment intact. But nobody complains that they are being 
taxed too little. This disparity means that government 
decisions to tax are always reviewed, but decisions not to tax 
are not, creating a one-way ratchet of less taxation. The ACS 
Court’s approach exacerbates this problem by reducing the 
provisions benefiting taxpayers that will be subject to review. 
Disputes involving tax expenditures are now even less likely to 
be litigated than tax deficiency cases since the ACS precedent 
treats them as cases involving individual, not state, action. 
Because it minimizes injuries, it also reduces the scrutiny that 
reviewed provisions will receive. 
  
 231 Without the Flast exception, plaintiffs need personal injury that is actual 
and concrete, caused by the defendant, and which could be remedied by a court decision 
in their favor. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 232 The government can be forced to litigate the same issue against numerous 
taxpayers. Although there is stare decisis for the judicial interpretation of tax statutes, 
there is no res judicata across taxpayers. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Roberts Court’s two recent tax opinions 
fundamentally change the way the law treats taxes and tax 
expenditures under the Constitution. The justices placed taxes 
and tax expenditures on a legal pedestal, favoring tax statutes 
compared to government regulation and direct spending. 
Whether raising government revenue or losing it, the tax law 
has proved powerful enough to fend off the Constitution. 
This article has demonstrated how the economic approach 
to tax law and policy is in tension with legal analysis of taxation, 
particularly where the tax law intersects constitutional law. It 
has also shown how the Supreme Court’s new favoritism of tax 
law might create problems, for both law and policy. Observers of 
the tax law should worry about the fallout from the Court’s 
decisions, as legislators turn to their tax laws to direct resources 
where they may not constitutionally spend money. These cases 
undercut the efforts of tax reformers, and make the goal of 
achieving a fair and simple tax system even more elusive than it 
might otherwise have been. 
